The structure of the cognitive revolution: An examination from the philosophy of science

Abstract

The received view is that psychology has undergone several scientific revolutions similar to those that occurred in the physical sciences. Of these, this paper will consider the cognitive revolution. Because the arguments in favor of the existence of a cognitive revolution are cast using the concepts and terms of revolutionary science, we will examine the cognitive revolution using accounts of revolutionary science advanced by five influential philosophers of science. Specifically, we will draw from the philosophical positions of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, and Gross for the purpose of discussion. We conclude that no substantive revolution took place according to these accounts. This conclusion is based on data gathered from some of the major participants in the "cognitive revolution" and on a general scholarly survey of the literature. We argue that the so-called cognitive revolution is best characterized as a socio-rhetorical phenomenon.Key words: scientific revolution, cognitive revolution, fallibilism, paradigms, research programs, research traditions, rhetoric of science The received view is that psychology has undergone a few key scientific revolutions, similar to the scientific revolutions that have occurred in the physical sciences (Baars, 1986;Gardner, 1985).' Histories of psychology, for example, typically depict two revolutions: behaviorism's overthrow of mentalism in the first quarter of the 20th century, and in the second quarter of the century, cognitive psychology's overthrow of behaviorism (Buss, 1978; see Hergenhahn, 1997, p. 553 ff.). This paper will examine the latter of the two revolutions, what is generally called the cognitive revolution.We examine the cognitive revolution according to accounts of revolutionary science provided by five key philosophers of science. We conclude that no such substantive revolution took place, at least according to the accounts of revolutionary science provided by these ' See the Appendix for quotations relevant to this "received view," as it pertains to the cognitive revolution.

Rethinking Schizophrenia and Depression Comorbidity as One Psychiatric Disorder Entity: Evidence From Mouse Model

“…Therefore, the idea of recognizing depression and schizophrenia as two independent mental disorders that coexist as comorbid forms may be premature and lacks sufficient support. Such classical views should be challenged in a philosophical sense, as stated by Silverstein et al who called for a revolutionary re-thinking of scientific questions (Hesse, 1971;O'Donohue et al, 2003).…”

Strategies to solve the reverse inference fallacy in future MRI studies of schizophrenia: a review

“…(Hesse 1971)." The continued progress and radical revisioning of the field is essential to ensure that new scientific revolutions do not become solely applications of new terminology to existing questions or socio-rhetorical phenomena rather than actual advances in science (O'Donohue et al 2003). Inspired by these thoughts and the need to "rethink schizophrenia" by Insel, we agree that with Silverstein that radical revisioning of schizophrenia may be necessary to determine how advanced interdisciplinary technologies can be used to explore schizophrenia in new directions.…”

Análise do campo conceitual da engenharia de sistemas cognitivos e proposta de uma nova agenda de pesquisa

“…A palavra cognição remonta aos escritos de Platão e Aristóteles. Todavia, foi na metade do século passado, mais precisamente nos anos 1950 e 1960 que dois movimentos marcaram o início do estudo da cognição, especificamente nas ciências sociais, chamados de primeira e segunda revolução cognitiva (BAARS, 1986;BEM;KEIJZER, 1996;MILLER, 2003;O'DONOHUE;FERGUSON;NAUGLE, 2003;SPERBER;HIRSCHFELD, 2001). Tais movimentos são caracterizados pela convergência de trabalhos teóricos e experimentais em diversas áreas, tais como filosofia, psicologia, linguística, neurociências, sociologia e antropologia.…”