A tale of three blind men on the proper subject matter of clinical science and practice: Commentary on Plaud's behaviorism vs. Ilardi and Feldman's cognitive neuroscience

Abstract

Plaud (J Clin Psychol 57, 1089-1102, 1109-1111, 1119-1120) and Ilardi and Feldman (J Clin Psychol 57, 1067-1088, 1103-1107, 1113-1117, 1121-1124) argue for two very different approaches to clinical science and practice (i.e., behavior analysis and cognitive neuroscience, respectively). We comment on the assets and liabilities of both perspectives as presented and attempt to achieve some semblance of balance between the three protagonists embroiled in this current debate. The vision of clinical science we articulate is more ecumenical and evolutionary, rather than paradigmatic and revolutionary. As we see it, the problem clinical psychology faces is much larger than the authors let on; namely, how best to make clinical science meaningful and relevant to practitioners, consumers, the general public, and the behavioral health-care community. Clinical psychology's immediate internal problem is not pluralism with regard to subject matter, worldview, methodology, or school of thought, but pluralism in clinical psychologists' adherence to a scientific epistemology as the only legitimate form of clinical psychology. On this latter point, we still have a very long way to go.

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

“…Furthermore, given that the major tool of counseling is language and given the linguistic community within which counselors work, it simply seems counterproductive to abandon mental concepts. Clients will continue to "frequently speak of private events as causes of their suffering" (Forsyth & Kelly, 2001, p. 1138. This places counseling on the horns of a dilemma: to adhere to a dualism that is criticized as being anti-intellectual or to adopt an approach that seems wholly impractical.…”

“…Critics have argued that such a relationship may never be demonstrated (Plaud, 2001;Uttal, 2000). More important, at its present state of development, neuroscience has provided little value to practitioners in their routine work with clients (Forsyth & Kelly, 2001;Strauman, 2001).…”