Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth

Gaultier, Benoit

doi:10.2307/44982146

American Philosophical Quarterly

2017

DOI: 10.2307/44982146

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Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth

Benoit Gaultier¹

Abstract: We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard’s answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that (a) knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that (b) truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I do so by showing that me… Show more

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“…Olsson has replied to criticisms inOlsson (2009),Olsson (2011aOlsson ( , 2011b, and elsewhere, alone or with collaborators. For recent discussions, see Brown (2012),Bates (2013),Pritchard (2016), andGaultier (2017).…”

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The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism

et al. 2022

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The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that their solution works given four empirical assumptions, which they claim hold “normally.” However, they do not show that their assumptions are externalistically acceptable; nor do they provide detailed evidence for their normality claim. We address these remaining gaps in Goldman and Olsson’s solution in a constructive spirit. In particular, we suggest an externalist interpretation of the assumptions such that they essentially spell out what it means for a broad range of organisms capable of belief-like representations to be epistemically adapted to their environment. Our investigation also sheds light on the circumstances in which the assumptions fail to hold and knowledge therefore fails to have extra value in Goldman and Olsson’s sense. The upshot is a deeper understanding of their solution as a contribution to naturalized epistemology and a strengthened case for its empirical validity.

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The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism

et al. 2022

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The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection

2020

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The aim of this special issue is to promote discussion on the value of truth and doxastic axiology. A key question of doxastic axiology is how to evaluate beliefs. There are three major approaches to it: the deontological one, the virtue theoretical one and the consequentialist one. The majority of the proponents of these approaches accepts the thesis that beliefs are primarily valuable because of their epistemic features. According to epistemic deontologism, certain epistemic norms determine whether it is permissible or not to have a certain belief (see Cohen 1984; Pollock 1987; and Feldman 2000). According to virtue epistemology, a valuable belief is an achievement of the epistemic agent manifesting an epistemic virtue in forming the belief in question (

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Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness?

Vollmer

2024

Episteme

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According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage over some other formulations of insulationism, I argue that the attributive goodness view of epistemic value should be rejected. On the one hand, shifting to a discussion of attributive goodness comes with several contentious commitments, as well as implausible upshots for epistemic axiology. On the other hand, I demonstrate that one can strengthen other forms of insulationism in such a way that the supposed advantage of the attributive goodness view diminishes.

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Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism

The Cognitive Basis of the Conditional Probability Solution to the Value Problem for Reliabilism

The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection

Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness?

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