The aim of this special issue is to promote discussion on the value of truth and doxastic axiology. A key question of doxastic axiology is how to evaluate beliefs. There are three major approaches to it: the deontological one, the virtue theoretical one and the consequentialist one. The majority of the proponents of these approaches accepts the thesis that beliefs are primarily valuable because of their epistemic features. According to epistemic deontologism, certain epistemic norms determine whether it is permissible or not to have a certain belief (see Cohen 1984; Pollock 1987; and Feldman 2000). According to virtue epistemology, a valuable belief is an achievement of the epistemic agent manifesting an epistemic virtue in forming the belief in question (
Various forms of disagreement are ubiquitous in all fields of discussion, for example in morality, philosophy, religion, politics, and aesthetics. Disagreement is related to a wide range of topics in epistemology, semantics, ontology, and morality. 1 Given the complexity of these interrelated 1
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