2024
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2023.63
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Epistemic Value as Attributive Goodness?

Michael Vollmer

Abstract: According to insulationism, a common take on epistemic value, being of epistemic value does not entail being of value simpliciter. In this paper, I explore one version of insulationism which has so far received little attention in the literature. On this view, epistemic value does not entail value simpliciter because it is a form of attributive goodness, that is, being good as a member of a particular kind. While having a significant advantage over some other formulations of insulationism, I argue that the att… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
0
0

Publication Types

Select...

Relationship

0
0

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 0 publications
references
References 47 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance

No citations

Set email alert for when this publication receives citations?