Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology

Abstract

Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we're right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.

Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?

“… Pritchard's non-doxastic account of hinges has been recently discussed regarding its merits to actually solving one of the faces of the skeptical challenge (seeColiva (2018),Jope (2019),Nebel (2019),Simion et al (2019),Zhang (2018)). My target is not Pritchard's particular account, but rather the prospects of a conception of hinges as a-rational, non-doxastic commitments that can rationally change over time to respond to relativism.…”