Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux

Pritchard, Duncan

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02504-2

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…An epistemic reason for p (and against q ) is a consideration that speaks to the truth of p (and the falsity of q ). Epistemic purism is the claim that only epistemic reasons can favor a proposition over an incompatible proposition (Neta, 2011: 661; Peacocke, 2004: 11; Pritchard, 2016: 80, 2021: 3656).…”

Section: Four Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism

Echeverri

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After that, I use those principles to formulate a diachronic skeptical argument. This argument yields the counterintuitive conclusion that understanding a global skeptical hypothesis is all it takes for a rational subject to lose all her perceptual knowledge of the world. Next, I show that a popular Austinian move must reject one or another of the principles that underlie ED. I close by delineating a novel strategy that can block the diachronic skeptical argument while preserving all the principles. The key idea is that perceptual knowledge is grounded in primitive, perceptual and recognitional abilities. This view sheds new light on some puzzling features of global skepticism that have been noted by Descartes and Hume, among others.

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Section: Four Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism

Echeverri

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Nor would all hinge epistemologists characterize hinge propositions as "assumptions" (if hinges are even propositions in the first place). See, for example, Pritchard (2015Pritchard ( , 2019. 8 See, for example, Wittgenstein (1969, OC § §196-206, 110, 130, 166, 121, 559).…”

Section: Hinge Epistemology and Philosophical Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Broadly construed. Those who have embraced hinge epistemology explicitly under that label, or under a slightly different one, include:Strawson (1985),Wright (1985Wright ( , 2004Wright ( , 2014,Moyal-Sharrock (2005),Kusch (2013Kusch ( , 2016aKusch ( , 2016bKusch ( , 2017,Schönbaumsfeld (2016),Pritchard (2015Pritchard ( , 2019, andColiva (2010Coliva ( , 2015. Though Michael Williams rejects the label, we tentatively includeWilliams (1991) here as well.…”

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confidence: 98%

What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on

Coliva

Doulas

2022

Synthese

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Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus is hard to find. Some think this should lead us to embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know, or justifiably believe, the philosophical views we defend and advance. Most philosophers in the literature fall into one camp or the other: philosophical skepticism or philosophical anti-skepticism. Drawing on the insights of hinge epistemology, this paper proposes another way forward, an intermediate position that appeals both to skeptical and anti-skeptical intuitions concerning the possibility and scope of philosophical knowledge. The main advantage of our account is that it's able to recover some philosophical knowledge while also being compatible with philosophical skepticism.

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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux

Cited by 2 publications

References 37 publications

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism

A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism

What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on

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