2015
DOI: 10.1080/14608944.2015.1066322
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Engineering confederalism for Iraq

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…20. Khan and Kirmanj (2015) recognize the importance of both factors, as they favor a confederal Iraq with non-majoritarian institutions at the center. 21.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…20. Khan and Kirmanj (2015) recognize the importance of both factors, as they favor a confederal Iraq with non-majoritarian institutions at the center. 21.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is presently generally acknowledged that the post-intrusion policy of de-Ba'athification, as practiced, had various unintended outcomes that made building Iraqi civil society particularly troublesome after the U.S.-led invasion (Kirmanj, 2013). The U.S. approach to deal with this strategy is frequently evaluated as having great oversight by underestimating the threats of increased sectarianism in Iraq and the requirement for efficacious endeavors to oversee ethno-partisan divisions (Khan, & Kirmanj, 2015). The Iraqi government's strategy in dealing with de-Ba'athification was, in any case, considerably more dangerous because of its one-sidedness and partisan nature (Mikail, 2014).…”
Section: Ethno-sectarian Division and The Predicaments Of National Inmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many analysts of Iraqi politics and society have offered explicative frameworks for making sense of the political crises and the rise of violence following the end of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial rule (Dodge, 2005; Marr, 2012; O'Leary, 2009). One of the most widely shared and perennial of these narratives is that ethno‐sectarian divisions in society are a primary cause of the current conflicts (Khan & Kirmanj, 2015; O'Leary, 2009; Saouli, 2009). According to this narrative, Iraqi society is cursed by a historic rift between three main communities (Sunni, Shiites, and Kurds), which rules out the possibility of building a unified nation‐state (Dawisha, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%