Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: The Case Against Consociationalism ‘Light’

Abstract

Scholars and practitioners tend to favor transitory power-sharing arrangements and liberal forms of consociationalism. Iraq's constitution of 2005 has both, but the country has been in turmoil ever since. This article argues that Iraq's political problems can be traced, in part, to the combination of temporary and liberal consociationalism, what is called here consociationalism 'light'. The lack of durable national power sharing, the preoccupation with self-rule at the expense of shared rule, and the invention of 'fluid federalism' left post-Saddam Iraq ill-prepared for the challenges to come. What many see as the advantages of consociationalism 'light', its flexibility and open-ended nature, turned out to be important drawbacks. The case of Iraq therefore has implications for the debate about institutional design in other divided societies.

Iraq’s Informal Consociationalism and Its Problems

“…Beyond the flawed process of its drafting, Bogaards has argued that the constitution also contributed to Iraq’s violent instability because it incorporated few or no power‐sharing mechanisms. He argues that the weak, liberal, voluntary and informal power‐sharing in the constitution failed to deliver ‘a stable framework for the accommodation of communal tensions’ (Bogaards 2019b:2). This argument echoes Donald Horowitz’s critique that ‘Apart from enshrining values of federalism […] it is difficult to identify in that document any institutions designed to reduce ethnic or sectarian conflict’ (Horowitz 2008:1230).…”

“…John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary herald the constitution – which O’Leary was involved in drafting – as a key example of liberal consociationalism (McGarry and O’Leary 2007). Matthijs Bogaards, by contrast, traces Iraq’s current political problems back to what he terms the constitution’s ‘light’ consociationalism, focused on temporary power‐sharing measures and ‘fluid federalism’ (Bogaards 2019b:2). Still others emphasize the exclusionary, secretive and rushed manner in which the document was written and the flaws this has created (Aboultaif 2020; Anderson 2015; Arato 2009; Hay 2014; Horowitz 2008; McEvoy and Morrow 2005).…”

Democratic and Autocratic Nation Building

“…Postconflict countries, such as Iraq (Bogaards 2019) and Lebanon (Nagle 2016), attempt to implement these recommendations for generating peaceful coexistence within a common political community with mixed effects. Canada is often described as a successful example of utilizing multicultural and inclusive institutions and practices, such as inclusive Canada Day celebrations (Hayday 2010) and federalism, to incorporate French-speakers, English-speakers, and First Nations into the Canadian nation.…”

Consociational Power‐Sharing in the Arab World: A Critical Stocktaking

“…When any renegotiation of the predetermined ethno-sectarian quota jeopardizes the very raison d'être of the consociational power-sharing arrangement? Or when informal rules are often more effective than formal ones in precluding institutional change (Bogaards 2019a(Bogaards , 2019b?…”

“…He argues that constant revisions of the original theory rendered consociationalism contradictory, incoherent, and thus impossible to test. Is post‐invasion Iraq, for example, a case of liberal consociation (McGarry and O’Leary 2007), or of a failed consociationalism ‘light’ (Bogaards 2019b) gathering elements of temporary and liberal consociation – one that should be replaced by a more straightforward type of corporate consociation? Similarly, was the civil war in Lebanon a consequence of the failure of its own specific variant of corporate consociation (Lijphart 2001) or of consociationalism’s immobilism problem per se (Hudson 1988)?…”