Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers

Abstract

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The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries

“…We mention in the following paragraphs some of the possible modifications. Maybe the most important development is the work on coalition theory of Ray and Vohra (1994); Yi and Shin (1995); Yi (1997) and Bloch (1995Bloch ( , 1996; Bloch et al (1997). They allow many coalitions to be formed, although they employ a different rule of forming coalitions.…”

“…Ray and Vohra (1994) analyse Equilibrium Binding Agreements (a game in which coalitions can only break up into smaller coalitions), Bloch (1996) shows that the infinite-horizon Coalitional Unanimity game (game in which a coalition is formed if and only if all members agree to form it) yields a unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure. Yi and Shin (1995) examine an Open Membership Coalitional game (in which nonmembers can join a coalition without the permission of existing members). Yi (1997) shows that in the Open Membership Coalitional game the grand coalition can be an equilibrium outcome for positive externalities.…”

“…We are aware of the recent work on coalition theory by Ray and Vohra (1994); Yi and Shin (1995) and Bloch (1996); Bloch et al (1997) who consider symmetric players. We think that modeling two self-enforcing IEA with asymmetric players (we present two types of players) can bring a better understanding of improving capacity of IEA's.…”

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

“…In exclusive membership games (Yi and Shin, 1994) or game ∆ (Hart and Kurz, 1983), each player can join a coalition only with the consensus of the existing members, but she is free to leave the coalition. In this decision process, each player's message consists in a list of players with whom she wants to form a coalition.…”

“…Finally, in coalition unanimity games (Yi and Shin, 1994;Chander and Tulkens, 1997;Bloch, 1997) or game Γ (Hart and Kurz, 1983), no coalition can form without the unanimous consensus of its members. This implies that players are not free to either join the coalition or to leave it.…”