Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups’ Preferences Conflict

Conley, John P.; Temimi, Akram

doi:10.1086/318601

Cited by 81 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)and (2001)) -however the revolution itself is not modelled in these papers. Conley and Temimi (2001), on the other hand examine the incentives of unenfranchised groups to engage in political action to get the vote. However the focus is not on the microfoundations of protest but rather the impact of the threat on the policies regarding extension of voting rights by the ruling class.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Protests and reputation

2006

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Protests take place for a variety of reasons. In this paper we focus on protests that have a well defined objective, that is in conflict with the objectives of the government. Hence the success or failure of a protest movement depends crucially on how the government responds. We assume that government types are private information so that governments have an interest in building a reputation to deter protestors. We extend the standard reputation framework to one where potential protesters in the domestic jurisdiction are competing in a common market with protestors of a foreign jurisdiction, resulting in a situation where domestic governments care about the decisions of foreign governments. We derive conditions under which an equilibrium with "contagion" in protests might exist: protests that start in one jurisdiction spread to others. Finally we use our results to interpret the Fuel tax protests in France and England that took place in 2000 as well as the three successive pro-democracy revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-05. * We are grateful for comments from Massimo Morelli, Alain Trannoy and an anonymous referee.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Much of this literature distinguishes between protests that are made as a signal to the government and as a purely democratic expression from extreme examples of protests like revolutions or coups (e.g. Conley and Temimi, 2001). We focus however on the first type of protest movement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Protests and reputation

2006

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“…In the absence of a possibility to commit to fiscal policies, the elite is forced to extend the franchise. Conley and Temimi (2001) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) provide similar theories in which a larger conflict potential of the disenfranchised population increases the likelihood for them to be allocated voting rights. Our theory also delivers the possibility of an alternative transition scenario in which the process of democratization may represent a Pareto-improvement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

Cervellati¹,

Fortunato²,

Sunde

2012

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Consensual and Conflictual DemocratizationMatteo Cervellati Piergiuseppe Fortunato Uwe Sunde D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT Consensual and Conflictual Democratization *We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions.JEL Classification: H10, O20, N10

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“…Note that at this time, the order by which the groups or coalition of groups bargain between each other change according to the identity of the group or coalition rejecting the democratic outcome. 19 As primitive; however, in the appendix, we endogenize this grabbing function via a process of recursive Nash bargaining where the power of a class or coalition of classes is determined by the surplus each group or coalition is able to appropriate in case of civil war. 19 More in details:…”

Section: Renegotiation and Coalition Formation At T =mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…19 As primitive; however, in the appendix, we endogenize this grabbing function via a process of recursive Nash bargaining where the power of a class or coalition of classes is determined by the surplus each group or coalition is able to appropriate in case of civil war. 19 More in details:…”

Section: Renegotiation and Coalition Formation At T =mentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

Ghosal¹,

Proto²

2009

Journal of Public Economics

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This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite con ‡ict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are suf…ciently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.Keywords: Democracy, con ‡ict, collective action, coalition formation, party formation, bargaining, risk-sharing.JEL Classi…cation: D74, O12, H11.We thank Daron Acemoglu, Pranhab Bardhan, Francis Bloch, Steve Broadberry, Oded Galor, Mark Harrison, Alessandro Lizzeri, Ben Lockwood, Miltos Makris, Omer Moav, Joel Mokyr, Sharun Mukand, Andrew Newman, Jim Robinson and Juuso Valimaki for helpful comments and suggestions. The obvious disclaimer applies.

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Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups’ Preferences Conflict

Cited by 81 publications

References 11 publications

Protests and reputation

Protests and reputation

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

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