Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Consensual and Conflictual DemocratizationMatteo Cervellati Piergiuseppe Fortunato Uwe Sunde D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S ABSTRACT Consensual and Conflictual Democratization *We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. The features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution implemented under it depend on the allocation of de facto political power across the different social groups. The cost of public enforcement of property rights depends on the extent of predation activities in the economy. The theory highlights the importance of inequality in natural resources and availability of human capital for endogenous democratic transitions. Multiple politico-economic equilibria can be sustained conditional on expectations about property rights enforcement. This generates history dependence. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed in conflictual environments. We test the novel predictions using available cross-country data. The link between the type of democratic transition and the outcomes under democracy is also investigated using novel data on constitutional principles. The findings support the theoretical predictions.JEL Classification: H10, O20, N10

Civil Conflict, Democratization, and Growth: Violent Democratization as Critical Juncture

“…Formal theories that investigate the determinants and consequences of different democratization scenarios are presented by Cervellati et al . (, ).…”

On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power

“…These exogenous sources of change may be due to shocks, but they may also be built in to the authority rule. Exogenous sources of political change would move the analysis closer to traditional models of dynamically inconsistent policy choice -for instance hyperbolic β − δ policy models 23 as well the famous fiscal policy models of Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). In these models a marginal effect somewhat similar to the preservation effect arises due to the conflict between current and future decision makers as calendar time changes the identity of the decision maker.…”

Legal efficiency and consistency

“…18 See also Cervellati et al (2007) who study the joint determination of political regimes (democracies vs oligarchies) and property right protection.…”