Empresários e financiamento de campanhas na eleição presidencial brasileira de 2014

Mancuso, Wagner Pralon; Horochovski, Rodrigo Rossi; Camargo, Neilor Fermino

doi:10.4322/tp.25307

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Theoretically, corporate sectors finance electoral campaigns for different reasons: i) ideological preferences; ii) social ties with the beneficiary (e.g., friendship, family and links, class identity); iii) a pragmatic strategy to foster closer relationships with the ruling party or opposition parties with a higher chance of winning; iv) as compensation for benefits given in the past (government contracts, favorable legislative or administrative decisions); and v) expectation of gaining these same type benefits in the future (Mancuso, Horochovski and Camargo, 2016).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, in the 2014 presidential campaign, approximately 94% of the financial resources stemmed from corporations. Furthermore, most of the corporate campaign donations come from only a few sectors of the economy, such as banks and building contractors, which usually have strong links with government policies, whether for regulatory issues or large contracts (Mancuso, Horochovski and Camargo, 2016). This percentage decreases in the funding for congressional elections, but not to the point of withdrawing the leading role of the private sector.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this sense, the literature argues that the system induces the candidates to compete not only against other parties' rivals but also against members of their coalition (Nicolau, 2013;Mancuso, Horochovski and Camargo, 2016). This situation increases 'Robin Hood in Reverse': persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy the level of competition, including among party associates (Silva and Cervi, 2017), that together with the large size of the electoral district (Silva et al, 2015;Silva and Cervi, 2017) and the universalization and mandatory voting, make the campaigns more and more expensive.…”

Section: Causal Mechanisms Of the Persistence Of Income Inequality In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

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DP 0255 - ‘Robin Hood in Reverse’: persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy

Cavalcante¹

2021

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Despite improvements in the living conditions of the population, there has not been a significant change in income disparities. Since the growth of left-wing parties and political competition as per the median voter hypothesis do not stand in the Brazilian case, what could explain the tenacity of inequality in the country? To answer this, the paper, grounded in new institutionalism theory, employed a process-tracing method to explore the causes of the continuity of unequal income distribution in Brazil. The inquiry tests the mechanism using the case of redistributive fiscal policy and the literature of electoral rules and business influence in the political system. This analysis reinforces that the Brazilian government not only misuses its fiscal instruments to distribute income, but also acts as a ‘Robin Hood in reverse’: that is, it withdraws from those who have less to subsidize or pay transfers to those who have more.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Causal Mechanisms Of the Persistence Of Income Inequality In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

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DP 0255 - ‘Robin Hood in Reverse’: persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy

Cavalcante¹

2021

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“…Figura 3: Os cinco maiores doadores de campanha eleitoral dentre as indústrias de bebidas açucaradas propriamente ditas e as indústrias de insumos para sua produção aos candidatos ao Senado Federal em 2010. Esse perfil de contribuições de campanha pelas indústrias de bebidas açucaradas e seus insumos está alinhado com o do setor empresarial como um todo: preferência por candidatos do sexo masculino, brancos, com elevado grau de instrução, profissionais da política e pertencentes a organizações partidárias estruturadas (CERVI et al, 2015;MANCUSO et al, 2016;MANCUSO et al, 2018). Quando distribuídos segundo o grau de dependência nas contribuições de campanha oriundas das indústrias de bebidas açucaradas e seus insumos, observa-se uma baixa proporção de candidatos com dependência elevada (mais de 25% de contribuições de campanha de origem empresarial provenientes do setor), com percentuais que variam entre 2,5% a 6,9% (Tabela 7).…”

Section: Resultsunclassified

“…O terceiro candidato recebeu recursos da Recofarma, porém apenas por intermédio de seu partido político e, embora não eleito, foi incluído na lista de suplentes e assumiu o cargo posteriormente na legislatura: Eron Bezerra (PCdoB-AM). O quarto candidato, Sabino Castelo Branco (PTB-AM), que também figurou na lista de suplentes e veio a ocupar o cargo de Deputado Federal durante a legislatura, recebeu, por intermédio de seu partido, recursos de campanha oriundos de outras empresas do setor: Spal (Coca-Cola Femsa) e Sorocaba Refrescos (também integrante do Sistema Coca-Cola Brasil).Todos os candidatos à Câmara dos Deputados que contaram com recursos do setor em suas campanhasde forma direta ou indiretahaviam ocupado cargos na 54ª Legislatura e buscavam a reeleição do governo, com a manutenção do status quo(McMENAMIN, 2012;MANCUSO, 2015;MANCUSO et al 2016;CARAZZA, 2018). Esse investimento eleitoral certamente compensava às empresas, dados os vultuosos valores por elas recebidos por meio de créditos tributários.…”

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Financiamento de campanhas eleitorais e lobby da indústria de bebidas açucaradas e seus insumos no Congresso Nacional

Mariath¹

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Introduction: Sugary drinks taxation is among a set of recommended public policies to tackle obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases. However, it faces strong opposition from the industry, which uses corporate political activity (CPA) strategies and practices to prevent it. Objective: To assess whether CPA of the sugary drinks and their inputs industriesespecially electoral campaign financing and lobbyinghave influenced decision-making on sugary drinks taxation in the 55 th Congress of the Brazilian legislature (2015)(2016)(2017)(2018)(2019). Methods: Data on campaign contributions from the sector to congressional candidates (Federal Senate in 2010 and Chamber of Deputies in 2014, available from the Superior Electoral Court, were assessed. Contributions were described according to variables related to sociodemographics, region, and political party. Generalized linear model analysis with negative binomial regression was used to assess the effect of the contributions on the chances of election. Legislative proposals related to sugary drinks taxation considered during the 55 th Congress were identified. Four of them were selected for a case study to explain their approval in the Federal Senate, using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis, and their subsequent rejection in the Chamber of Deputies. Results: Fifty-six corporate groups that produce sugary drinks and 62 that produce their inputs (sugar and fruit concentrates) contributed to the campaigns. In 2010, contributions from input industries prevailed while in 2014 those from sugary drinks industries did. Participation from corporate groups associated to Abir, Unica, and CitrusBR also prevailed. Contributions benefited 96 candidates to the Federal Senate and 585 to the Chamber of Deputies and helped elect 48 Senators and 237 Federal Deputies. Four Legislative Decree bills aimed at keeping tax benefits to soda industries which operate in the Manaus Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) were selected for the case study. The interests of major sugary drink industries prevailed in the Federal Senate, where the favorable votes of the Senators were explained by the following conditions, isolated or combined: representing a State with free trade area of the MFTZ; being filiated to PSDB; having received campaign contributions from the sector; having an interest promoted by one of the Senators who supported the maintenance of the tax benefits to soda industries in the MFTZ; representing a State from the North or Northeast; defending tax benefits for their own region; having being elected in 2010. In the Chamber of Deputies, rejection of the bills was determined by the absence of political articulation of the representatives of Amazonas State and the deliberation in the Finance and Taxation Committee, where there was a group of members who were favorable to the interests of soda industries based in other States. Members of both legislative Houses showed little concern regarding the public health issue involved. Conclusion: The actions taken by the private sector to maintain th...

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Political Coordination and Socioeconomic Coalitions

Schedelik

2023

The Political Economy of Upgrading Regimes: Brazil and Beyond

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Empresários e financiamento de campanhas na eleição presidencial brasileira de 2014

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

DP 0255 - ‘Robin Hood in Reverse’: persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy

DP 0255 - ‘Robin Hood in Reverse’: persistence and barriers to redistributive fiscal policy

Financiamento de campanhas eleitorais e lobby da indústria de bebidas açucaradas e seus insumos no Congresso Nacional

Political Coordination and Socioeconomic Coalitions

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