Employment service: Public or private?

Abstract

This paper deals with the relative performance of private and public employment services. For this purpose, two behavioral models are developed which take into account that private and and public employment agents not only pursue different aims but also face different restrictions, in particular since a public employment agency lacks the right to reject applicants. While analysis of the necessary optimality conditions yields tentative conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages of both types of employment service, empirically testable hypotheses result from the predicted responses to increases in unemployment and in the cost of service, respectively. These predicted behaviors are likely to be considered unfair by society, causing dissatisfaction with both private and public employment agencies.

Research and Application on the Third Party Quality Monitoring for Social Public Service: A Case Study of Survey Data in Liaoning Province

“…Through further follow-up and survey for dissatisfaction with employment services, it was found that 45% of the dissatisfied public reported fewer channels of consultation; 26% of the dissatisfied public reported that employment information was not released in a timely manner; and 16% of the dissatisfied public reported that the quality of job fairs was poor. The proportional annular figure 2-3 is shown by the annular figure, few consultation channels, release of employment behind time and poor quality of job fairs are the main factors that make the public dissatisfied with the quality of employment services [8], as shown in Figure 4.…”

Can the modernisation of a public employment service be an effective labour market intervention? The Hungarian experience, 2004-2008

“…Doubts about PES effectiveness have their roots in theory. Zweifel and Zaborowski (1996) ask the question if public or private employment services are better. This theoretical analysis suggests that private agencies might fare better largely because the public agency is not allowed to be selective in its user base and not as worried about placements as private agencies.…”

Diversité et efficacité des intermédiaires du placement

“…C'est d'ailleurs la motivation de Campens et Tanguy [2006] qui, supposant que l'agence privée est plus efficace que l'agence publique, obtiennent de manière assez prévisible que l'ouverture du marché du placement aux agences privées augmente les sorties du chômage et diminue le taux de chômage 5 . Pour trouver des travaux qui argumentent la moindre efficacité de l'intermédiaire public, il faut se tourner du côté de la théorie des choix publics ou de la bureaucratie (Zweifel et Zaborowski [1996] ; Kübler [1999]). Les agents du service public n'ont pas comme objectif un profit à réaliser sur un marché concurrentiel, d'où un moindre effort de leur part et un moindre volume d'appariements produits ; en revanche, ils ont des contraintes (non discrimination des chômeurs) et une mission spécifique (accompagnement des chômeurs et en particulier de longue durée).…”