Empirical Research on Corporate Governance in China: A Review and New Directions for the Future

Shen, Wei; Zhou, Qiong; Lau, Chak Po

doi:10.1017/mor.2015.11

Cited by 21 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 186 publications

(481 reference statements)

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“…According to our theory, these practices can lead to significant strategic opportunity costs and aggregated loss in shareholder wealth. It is worth noting that boards do not all exert strong control in corporate governance; instead, they are still rather weak in countries such as China (Shen, Zhou, & Lau, ). In this situation, an increase of strategic control by boards over managerial decision is likely to reduce the aggregated loss in shareholder wealth because the reduction in the costs of managerial opportunism tends to be greater than the strategic opportunity costs incurred.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

Ponomareva

Shen

Umans

2019

Corporate Governance

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Research Question/Issue How does organizational context influence the impact of board control over managerial decisions on shareholder wealth? Research Findings/Insights We introduce a new theoretical concept—organizational discretion—to characterize the upper limit of managers' latitude of actions presented by their organizational context and propose that it moderates the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. Specifically, we first argue that strategic control by boards over managerial decisions reduces managers' latitude of actions and leads to trade‐offs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities, which consequently influence the relationship between strategic control and shareholder wealth. We then suggest that the trade‐offs incurred by strategic control over managerial decisions are more prominent in firms with high organizational discretion. Because of the trade‐offs, we propose that boards are likely to decide whether to rely more on strategic control or financial control in internal corporate governance based on their firms' level of organizational discretion. Theoretical/Academic Implications By introducing the concept of organizational discretion and highlighting the trade‐offs caused by boards' strategic control over managerial decisions, we advance a contingency perspective to enhance the understanding about the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. It also bridges the strategic management and corporate governance research on managerial discretion that has largely evolved separately in the literature. Practitioner/Policy Implications Boards should attend to the trade‐offs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities when exercising strategic control over managerial decisions. Moreover, considering the trade‐offs involved, boards should carefully design and implement internal corporate governance mechanisms based on their firms' level of organizational discretion.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

Ponomareva

Shen

Umans

2019

Corporate Governance

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“…For example, traditionally, companies from American and Western European countries have evolved with the different corporate strategies and cost stickiness under different managerial expectations from companies in China as well as in other emerging markets, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. Even, in the representative emerging markets, China and India have very different corporate histories and corporate governances [67,68] that might have affected these factors. Hence, comparative studies among these dissimilar countries are needed to compare our findings with others.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business Strategy, State-Owned Equity and Cost Stickiness: Evidence from Chinese Firms

et al. 2020

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This paper investigates the relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness under different ownership. Using the data from listed firms in China from 2002 to 2015, we find that first, firms with different strategies exhibit different cost behavior. The cost stickiness of choosing a differentiation strategy is higher than that of choosing a low-cost strategy. Second, management expectations will affect cost stickiness. Optimistic expectations will increase cost stickiness, while pessimistic expectations will reduce cost stickiness. Third, management expectations can adjust the relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness in terms of government-created advantages (GCAs). If management expectations tend to be optimistic, the cost stickiness is higher with a differentiation strategy than with a low-cost strategy. If management expectations tend to be pessimistic, then cost stickiness is higher with a low-cost strategy than with a differentiation strategy. Finally, the state-owned equity affects the extent of the effect of a differentiation strategy on cost stickiness. State-owned firms, which receive more GCAs than non-state-owned firms, have stronger cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both categories of firms use more differentiation strategy.

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“…Verifica-se que apesar de diversas pesquisas já terem sido realizadas, os resultados empíricos não são conclusivos devido à falta da consideração do contexto (FILATOTCHEV e BOYD, 2009). A literatura sugere que é possível que os contextos organizacionais dentro de uma sociedade ou de um país sejam suficientemente semelhantes para que a pesquisa se dê neste nível (SHEN et al, 2016;FILATOTCHEV e BOYD, 2009). Sistemas de Governança nacionais são sistemas complexos com questões ignoradas pelas teorias mais tradicionais no campo da Governança Corporativa (CHARREAUX, 2004), como a Teoria da Agência, que olha os atores em sua racionalidade limitada (SIMON, 1947), com foco em explorar o conflito entre donos e administradores, ou donos majoritários e minoritários (SHEN et al, 2016).…”

Section: A Perspectivas Teóricas Em Governança Corporativaunclassified

“…A literatura sugere que é possível que os contextos organizacionais dentro de uma sociedade ou de um país sejam suficientemente semelhantes para que a pesquisa se dê neste nível (SHEN et al, 2016;FILATOTCHEV e BOYD, 2009). Sistemas de Governança nacionais são sistemas complexos com questões ignoradas pelas teorias mais tradicionais no campo da Governança Corporativa (CHARREAUX, 2004), como a Teoria da Agência, que olha os atores em sua racionalidade limitada (SIMON, 1947), com foco em explorar o conflito entre donos e administradores, ou donos majoritários e minoritários (SHEN et al, 2016). Brown et al (2011) clamam por teorias que expliquem de forma complementar as práticas de Governança Corporativa.…”

Section: A Perspectivas Teóricas Em Governança Corporativaunclassified

“…Brown et al (2011) clamam por teorias que expliquem de forma complementar as práticas de Governança Corporativa. Os pesquisadores têm buscado explorar o uso de teorias diferentes das usualmente utilizadas na área, como: Teoria da Firma, Teoria do Custo de Transação, Teoria Politica e Sociológica, Teoria da Visão Baseada em Recursos, Teoria Institucional, Teoria dos Acionistas (shareholder), Teoria das Partes Relacionadas (stakeholder), Teoria do Procurador (stewardship) (BRENNAN e SOLOMON, 2008; PING e ANDY, 2011; AFZA e NAZIR, 2014; AL- BAIDHANI, 2014;SHEN et al, 2016; AHMAD e OMAR, 2016). São exploradas novas concepções e resultados para a Governança Corporativa, bem como contextos sociais específicos, como o das economias em desenvolvimento (AFZA e NAZIR, 2014;SHEN et al, 2016).…”

Section: A Perspectivas Teóricas Em Governança Corporativaunclassified

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Governança Corporativa e Fenomenografia: Revisão de Literatura e Proposição de Abordagem Teórico-Metodológica

Trevia

Jardim

Rocha-Pinto

2020

ROC

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O campo da Governança Corporativa vem sendo objeto de estudos organizacionais que indicam a necessidade de novas perspectivas teóricas e metodológicas a serem consideradas em pesquisas na área. Esse interesse foi identificado em uma revisão da literatura sobre Governança Corporativa, com foco em identificar consolidações de discussões teóricas e metodológicas na área. Este artigo discute uma abordagem de pesquisa qualitativa e interpretativa que pode contribuir tanto para a evolução das teorias quanto para o desenvolvimento desta prática organizacional. Constatou-se que a prática de Governança Corporativa pode ser considerada como um sistema contextualizado, dinâmico e aberto, tornando o campo propenso à proposição da fenomenografia como uma abordagem teórico-metodológica, a qual se verificou que possui as características que atendem às necessidades de pesquisa, podendo gerar resultados inovadores.

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Empirical Research on Corporate Governance in China: A Review and New Directions for the Future

Cited by 21 publications

References 186 publications

Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

Organizational discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

Business Strategy, State-Owned Equity and Cost Stickiness: Evidence from Chinese Firms

Governança Corporativa e Fenomenografia: Revisão de Literatura e Proposição de Abordagem Teórico-Metodológica

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