Empathy without Isomorphism: A Phenomenological Account

Zahavi, Dan; Overgaard, Søren

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262016612.003.0001

Cited by 33 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Indeed, given Jacob's definition, it is doubtful whether empathy can play any foundational role in our understanding of others at all (cf. Zahavi and Overgaard 2012). Now, over the years, empathy has of course been defined in various ways, and if Jacob wants to reserve the term for a quite narrow class of phenomena-primarily exemplified by the case of empathetic pain-, he can of course choose to do so, though such a use will differ rather markedly from the way the term is used by most other people, including early empathy theorists such as Lipps, Stein and Husserl, who took it to designate the most basic capacity to recognize others as minded creatures (cf.…”

Section: Empathy and Isomorphismmentioning

confidence: 97%

Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal

2011

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Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This paper addresses some of these critical responses, and distinguishes-in the process-substantive disagreements from terminological issues and other issues that are symptomatic of different research agendas. It does so by focusing specifically upon some objections made by Pierre Jacob. These epitomize the kinds of concerns that are being raised about PP at the moment, and thus facilitate a reply on behalf of PP that also applies more generally.Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, de Vignemont and Jacob (2010/under review) have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). In the following, I will address some of these critical responses, and in particular consider some recent objections made by Pierre Jacob. These epitomize the kinds of concerns that are being raised about PP at the moment, and thus facilitate a reply on behalf of PP that also applies more generally.

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Section: Empathy and Isomorphismmentioning

confidence: 97%

Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal

2011

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“…Zahavi and Overgaard (2011), however, suggest that contagion and conscious ascription are not incompatible. Nonetheless, behaviors described in the one-and two-year olds may satisfy their criteria for empathy.…”

Section: Can a Simulation Account Of Empathy Avoid These Problems?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zahavi and Overgaard (2011) have pointed to some perplexities involved in some of these conditions. The affectivity condition: there is no empathy unless both target and empathizer experience some affective state.…”

Section: Empathy With a Special Statusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative

Gallagher¹

2012

Sci Context

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ArgumentA number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; but it fails to adequately address two other problems: the diversity problem and the starting problem. It is argued that a narrative approach to empathy obviates all these problems and offers a more parsimonious account.

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“…It is common to cite, for example, a torturer who, on my account, 'empathises' with his victim the better to inflict pain. Or we might think of Zahavi and Overgaard's (2012) case of two angry men in a fight. Such cases do seem somewhat at odds with at least one use of 'empathy', according to which to empathise with someone's suffering is, at least in part, to be moved to aid them.…”

Section: Empathy and Carementioning

confidence: 99%

What is empathy for?

Smith

2015

Synthese

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The concept of empathy has received much attention from philosophers and also from both cognitive and social psychologists. It has, however, been given widely conflicting definitions, with some taking it primarily as an epistemological notion and others as a social one. Recently, empathy has been closely associated with the simulationist approach to social cognition and, as such, it might be thought that the concept's utility stands or falls with that of simulation itself. I suggest that this is a mistake. Approaching the question of what empathy is via the question of what it is for, I claim that empathy plays a distinctive epistemological role: it alone allows us to know how others feel. This is independent of the plausibility of simulationism more generally. With this in view I propose an inclusive definition of empathy, one likely consequence of which is that empathy is not a natural kind. It follows that, pace a number of empathy researchers, certain experimental paradigms tell us not about the nature of empathy but about certain ways in which empathy can be achieved. I end by briefly speculating that empathy, so conceived, may also play a distinctive social role, enabling what I term 'transparent fellow-feeling'.

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Empathy without Isomorphism: A Phenomenological Account

Cited by 33 publications

References 18 publications

Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal

Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal

Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative

What is empathy for?

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