Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative

Abstract

ArgumentA number of theorists have proposed simulation theories of empathy. A review of these theories shows that, despite the fact that one version of the simulation theory can avoid a number of problems associated with such approaches, there are further reasons to doubt whether simulation actually explains empathy. A high-level simulation account of empathy, distinguished from the simulation theory of mindreading, can avoid problems associated with low-level (neural) simulationist accounts; but it fails to adequately address two other problems: the diversity problem and the starting problem. It is argued that a narrative approach to empathy obviates all these problems and offers a more parsimonious account.

Mentalization, embodiment, and narrative: Critical comments on the social ontology of mentalization theory

“…Finally, in restricting the development of mentalizing models to the infant/caretaker dyad, it is worth considering whether or not MT might be susceptible to a variant of what S. Gallagher has called "the diversity problem" in simulation theories (Gallagher, 2012). Gallagher proposes that the simulationist idea -that we use our own experiences to project ourselves imaginatively into the Others perspective -is problematic because it is nowhere given from this account of social cognition that my mental life would be similar to that of the other.…”

Mentaliseringsteorien – mangler og muligheder

“…Meget af den aktuelle diskussion af empati har vaeret fokuseret omkring ToM (Gallagher, 2001(Gallagher, , 2012Ratcliffe, 2012Ratcliffe, , 2014Zahavi, 2011a). I ToM sidestilles empati ofte med simulation, og simulationsteorien kaldes 'empathy theory' af ToMteoretikere (Goldman, 2006).…”

“…I ToM sidestilles empati ofte med simulation, og simulationsteorien kaldes 'empathy theory' af ToMteoretikere (Goldman, 2006). Heroverfor fastholder faenomenologerne, at empati ikke kan forstås ved hjaelp af ToM, men at empati involverer en umiddelbar forstå-else af den anden, inklusiv dennes emotionelle tilstand, og at en replikation af en persons mentale tilstand ikke udgør en forståelse af dennes emotionelle tilstand, men ville vaere emotionel smitte (Ratcliffe, 2014) eller sympati (Gallagher, 2012).…”

“…Faenomenologerne haevder også, at match eller simulation ikke kan vaere den almindelige måde at forstå andre på, og at empati ikke nødvendigvis betyder, at to personer er i samme emotionelle tilstand, men snarere, at ligheden er i forhold til de intentionelle strukturer af deres emotionelle tilstande (Gallagher, 2012).…”

“…Gallaghers beskrivelse af primaer intersubjektivitet (Gallagher, 2012) inkluderer den intentionelle forståelse, som er involveret i den faenomenologiske opfattelse af empati og forståelsen af implicit mentalisering, som beskrives som udspillende sig automatisk og delvist i kropsholdning og tonefald (Allen, 2013) kunne rummes i Gallaghers beskrivelse. Denne beskrivelse af primaer intersubjektivitet adskiller sig fra den forståelse, som kommer til udtryk i Fonagy og kollegers beskrivelse (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002), hvor primaer intersubjektivitet implicerer bevidsthed om den mentale tilstand.…”