Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Stanley, Matthew L.; Parikh, Natasha; Stewart, Gregory W.; Brigard, Felipe De

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Moreover, memories of actual experiences can be contrasted with simulations of counterfactual events (e.g., "If instead we had taken a trip to the lake …"). These counterfactuals induce emotional responses, such as regret, that further intensify with repeated simulations (Stanley et al 2017) and that have been shown to influence prospective choices (Camille et al 2004). Counterfactual simulations of reliably remembered events can thus motivate future-oriented decisions, which we argue constitutes an adaptive role for the veridical recall of the past (see also Schacter et al 2015).…”

Section: Retrieval Is Central To the Distinctive Function Of Episodicmentioning

confidence: 81%

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Mahr¹,

Csibra²

2017

Behav Brain Sci

222

152

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Short Abstract-We propose a novel account of episodic memory function based on a conceptual and empirical analysis of its role in belief formation. We provide a critique of the view that episodic memory serves future-directed imagination, and argue that the central features of this capacity can instead be explained by the role it plays in human communication. On this view, episodic memory allows us to communicatively support our interpretations of the past by gauging when we can assert epistemic authority. This capacity is ineliminable in justification of, and negotiations about, social commitments established by past interactions.Long Abstract-Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

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Section: Retrieval Is Central To the Distinctive Function Of Episodicmentioning

confidence: 81%

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Mahr¹,

Csibra²

2017

Behav Brain Sci

222

152

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“…It seems that as a strong predictor of autobiographical memory experience (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004), emotional intensity can be p/re‐experienced to a greater extent for actual or anticipated events than for events that could have occurred, but did not. Another possible explanation might be that the emotional intensity of episodic counterfactual thoughts may vary as a function of different factors, such as the valence of the actual event, direction of the counterfactual alternative (i.e., worse or better), or direct versus indirect exposure to a highly negative event prior to counterfactual thinking (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Roese, 1994; Stanley, Parikh, Stewart, & De Brigard, 2017). Future research needs to clarify these points.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characteristics of personally important episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections across age and culture

Özbek

Bohn

Berntsen

2020

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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Summary We have limited knowledge as to whether the phenomenological differences between episodic memories, counterfactuals, and future projections show the same pattern across age groups and diverse samples. Here we compared the characteristics of these mental events, reported by younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). In both studies, memories contained more sensory‐perceptual‐spatial details, were easier to bring to mind, and more specific. Future projections were the most positive, whereas counterfactuals were the least emotionally intense. In Study 1, older participants rated the events more positively and experienced them with more perceptual detail, whereas younger participants reported the future to be more voluntarily rehearsed, important, and central. These age differences did not replicate in Study 2. Overall, phenomenological differences between the events are robust and replicate across diverse samples. However, age differences are more sensitive to cultural or individual differences.

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“…He then asked them to imagine either better (upward CFT) or worse (downward CFT) alternatives to the actual experienced event. Participants induced to generate upward episodic counterfactual thoughts reported higher negative affect and greater feelings of regret relative to participants induced to generate downward episodic CFT (see also Gilovich and Medvec, 1995;Landman, 1993;Roese 1997;1999;Allen, Greenless, & Jones;Stanley, Parikh, et al, 2017). Complementary results have shown that generating downward episodic CFT about specific AM tend to evoke positive emotions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Specifically, we explore possible reactivation-related changes in five phenomenological dimensionsvalence, arousal, detail, ease and reliving-based upon two lines of evidence. On the one hand, several studies on both episodic future and CFT show reactivation-related effects on valence, arousal, and detail-although these effects are measured on the CFT per se, not the AM they are derived from (Szpunar and Schacter, 2013;De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013;Stanley, Parikh, et al, 2017). On the other hand, recent studies have shown effects on intensity (Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014), reliving (St Jacques, Szpunar and Schacter, 2017) and vividness (Akhtar, Justice, Loveday and Conway, 2017) in AM after perspective-shifts during reactivation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel about what was

Brigard

Hanna

Jacques

et al. 2018

Cognition and Emotion

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Episodic counterfactual thoughts (CFT) and autobiographical memories (AM) involve the reactivation and recombination of episodic memory components into mental simulations. Upon reactivation, memories become labile and prone to modification. Thus, reactivating AM in the context of mentally generating CFT may provide an opportunity for editing processes to modify the content of the original memory. To examine this idea, this paper reports the results of two studies that investigated the effect of reactivating negative and positive AM in the context of either imagining a better (i.e. upward CFT) or a worse (i.e. downward CFT) alternative to an experienced event, as opposed to attentively retrieving the memory without mental modification (i.e. remembering) or no reactivation. Our results suggest that attentive remembering was the best strategy to both reduce the negative affect associated with negative AM, and to prevent the decay of positive affect associated with positive AM. In addition, reactivating positive, but not negative, AM with or without CFT modification reduces the perceived arousal of the original memory over time. Finally, reactivating negative AM in a downward CFT or an attentive remembering condition increases the perceived detail of the original memory over time.

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Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Cited by 16 publications

References 37 publications

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Characteristics of personally important episodic memories, counterfactual thoughts, and future projections across age and culture

How thinking about what could have been affects how we feel about what was

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