Our tendency to engage in episodic counterfactual thinking—namely, imagining alternative ways in which past personal events could have occurred but did not—is ubiquitous. Although widely studied by cognitive and social psychologists, this autobiographically based variety of counterfactual thought has been connected only recently to research on the cognitive and neuroscientific basis of episodic memory and mental simulation. In the current article, we offer an empirical characterization of episodic counterfactual thinking by contrasting it with related varieties of mental simulation along three dimensions: temporal context, degree of episodic detail, and modal profile (i.e., perceived possibility or impossibility). In so doing, we offer a practical strategy to navigate the nascent literature on episodic counterfactual thinking within the context of other mental simulations, and we argue that the evidence surveyed strongly indicates that although connected along the aforementioned dimensions, episodic counterfactual thinking is a psychological process different from episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and semantic counterfactual thinking.

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When people revisit past autobiographical events they often imagine alternative ways in which such events could have occurred. Often these episodic counterfactual thoughts (eCFT) are momentary and fleeting, but sometimes they are simulated frequently and repeatedly. However, little is known about the neural differences between frequently versus infrequently repeated eCFT. The current study explores this issue. In a three-session study, participants were asked to simulate alternative ways positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical memories could have occurred. Half of these eCFT were repeatedly re-simulated while the other half were not. Immediately after, participants were asked to simulate all these eCFT again while undergoing fMRI. A partial least squares analysis on the resultant fMRI data revealed that eCFT that were not frequently repeated preferentially engaged brain regions including middle (BA 21) and superior temporal gyri (BA 38/39), middle (BA 11) and superior frontal gyri (BA 9), and hippocampus. By contrast, frequently repeated eCFT preferentially engaged regions including medial frontal gyri (BA 10), anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and inferior parietal lobule (BA 40). Direct contrasts for each type of eCFT were also conducted. The results of these analyses suggest differential contributions of regions traditionally associated with eCFT, such as BA 10, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus, as a function of kind of eCFT and frequency of repetition. Consequences for future research on eCFT and rumination are considered.

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