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Physical proximity to a traumatic event increases the severity of accompanying stress symptoms, an effect that is reminiscent of evolutionarily configured fear responses based on threat imminence. Despite being widely adopted as a model system for stress and anxiety disorders, fear-conditioning research has not yet characterized how threat proximity impacts the mechanisms of fear acquisition and extinction in the human brain. We used three-dimensional (3D) virtual reality technology to manipulate the egocentric distance of conspecific threats while healthy adult participants navigated virtual worlds during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Consistent with theoretical predictions, proximal threats enhanced fear acquisition by shifting conditioned learning from cognitive to reactive fear circuits in the brain and reducing amygdala–cortical connectivity during both fear acquisition and extinction. With an analysis of representational pattern similarity between the acquisition and extinction phases, we further demonstrate that proximal threats impaired extinction efficacy via persistent multivariate representations of conditioned learning in the cerebellum, which predicted susceptibility to later fear reinstatement. These results show that conditioned threats encountered in close proximity are more resistant to extinction learning and suggest that the canonical neural circuitry typically associated with fear learning requires additional consideration of a more reactive neural fear system to fully account for this effect.

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Positions of power involving moral decision-making are often held by older adults (OAs). However, little is known about age differences in moral decision-making and the intrinsic organization of the aging brain. In this study, younger adults (YAs; n = 117, M age = 22.11) and OAs (n = 82, M age = 67.54) made decisions in hypothetical moral dilemmas and completed resting-state multi-echo functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans. Relative to YAs, OAs were more likely to endorse deontological decisions (i.e., decisions based on adherence to a moral principle or duty), but only when the choice was immediately compelling or intuitive. By contrast, there was no difference between YAs and OAs in utilitarian decisions (i.e., decisions aimed at maximizing collective well-being) when the utilitarian choice was intuitive. Enhanced connections between the posterior medial core of the default network (pmDN) and the dorsal attention network, and overall reduced segregation of pmDN from the rest of the brain, were associated with this increased deontological-intuitive moral decision-making style in OAs. The present study contributes to our understanding of age differences in decision-making styles by taking into account the intuitiveness of the moral choice, and it offers further insights as to how age differences in intrinsic brain connectivity relate to these distinct moral decision-making styles in YAs and OAs.

No abstract