1997
DOI: 10.2307/136231
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Electricity Prices and Elections in Quebec

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Cited by 10 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The literature suggests that lack of regulatory effectiveness acts as an important barrier to commercial viability of power distribution utilities. The electricity prices may be politically manipulated for political ends (Bernard et al, 1997). Smith (2004) explains that the extent of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses in energy transmission is highly correlated with corruption in general, as well as weaknesses in accountability and institutional performance.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature suggests that lack of regulatory effectiveness acts as an important barrier to commercial viability of power distribution utilities. The electricity prices may be politically manipulated for political ends (Bernard et al, 1997). Smith (2004) explains that the extent of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses in energy transmission is highly correlated with corruption in general, as well as weaknesses in accountability and institutional performance.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, Hydro‐Quebec provides a case in point. With the Quebec government the sole shareholder, corporate decisions are necessarily politically laden, whether in matters of price setting or project development sites (Bernard et al . 1997).…”
Section: A Case Study: the Canadian Electricity Industrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, Hydro-Quebec provides a case in point. With the Quebec government the sole shareholder, corporate decisions are necessarily politically laden, whether in matters of price setting or project development sites (Bernard et al 1997). Public opposition has forced Hydro-Quebec to abandon projects, as in the case of Grande Baleine evaluated at some $544 million (Bernard et al 1992) and the more recent Suroît project (Bureau d'Audiences Publiques sur l'Environnement 2003).…”
Section: A Case Study: the Canadian Electricity Industrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Traditionnellement, de grandes entreprises intégrées bénéficiaient de monopoles territoriaux afin d'assurer une qualité du service et des tarifs uniformes. Plusieurs arguments pour une « libéralisation » du secteur de l'énergie ont marqué la fin des années quatre-vingt : concurrence, efficacité des activités, choix pour les consommateurs et baisse des prix (Bernard et coll., 1997 ; Pineau, 1998), alors que d'autres objectifs semblent demeurés : recherche de l'intérêt général à travers la sécurité de l'approvisionnement, l'accessibilité, l'égalité et la continuité du service. Dans l'ensemble, on observe l'émergence de nouvelles autorités de régulation et une transformation significative des processus décisionnels (Jordana et Levi-Faur, 2004 ; Ocana, 2003).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified