Electoral clientelism as status affirmation in Africa: evidence from Ghana

Abstract

Why does electoral clientelism persist when ballots are secret and elections are competitive? The provision of material rewards during campaigns is seen as the standard way politicians secure votes in ‘patronage democracies’. Yet monitoring clientelistic bargains is difficult when voting is secret, several competitors may provide material inducements simultaneously, voters view such inducements as gifts and not obligations, and candidates' records are more credible signals of future performance. I argue that where elections are competitive and voters expect gifts, candidates engage in a two-pronged strategy: affirm their own status through public displays of wealth, and undermine opponents' rewards by matching inducements or encouraging voters to break reciprocity norms. In result, neither side's gifts are sufficient for a win, and parties are forced to pursue different linkage mechanisms to voters. One such mechanism involves defining and targeting broader constituencies through policy proposals. Micro-level data from Ghana confirm these expectations. The theory is better suited to environments where candidates' past records are known to constituents than existing explanations, and accounts for the apparent contradiction between the ubiquity of campaign clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa and recent empirical findings that performance evaluations and non-contingent incentives matter most to voters.

Campus Politics and Intra-Party Vote Buying in Ghana: How Political Mentorship Could Destruct

“…However, Cheeseman and his colleagues also observe that an apparent increase in voter education, plus a burgeoning middle class in Ghana, does not have a significant effect on the reduction or eradication of vote buying, as the practice remains a main characteristic of Ghana's electoral democracy. This view is shared by other scholars (Linberg, 2003;Frempong, 2008;Cheeseman et al, 2016;Gadjanova, 2017). Yet, these studies mostly focus on national elections, with little attention to vote-buying dynamics in intra-party elections, and why party elites seem to develop a penchant for (re)distributive politics.…”

“…Where elections are competitive and voters expect gifts, candidates engage in a two-pronged strategy: affirm their own status through public displays of wealth, and undermine opponents' rewards by matching inducements or encouraging voters to break reciprocity norms. As a result, neither side's gifts are sufficient for a win (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008;Gadjanova, 2017). Therefore, parties are forced to pursue different linkage mechanisms to voters, including defining and targeting broader constituencies through policy proposals (Gadjanova, 2017).…”

“…As a result, neither side's gifts are sufficient for a win (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008;Gadjanova, 2017). Therefore, parties are forced to pursue different linkage mechanisms to voters, including defining and targeting broader constituencies through policy proposals (Gadjanova, 2017). Some scholars also argue that vote buying persists amidst growing democratisation due in part to the perceived and evidential weaknesses and manipulations of the rule of law coupled with underdeveloped political party structures in Africa (Carothers, 2006(Carothers, , 2007Adejumobi, 2007;LeBas, 2011).…”

“…To be sure, we do not attempt to establish a direct link between material inducement and vote outcome in general, as direct correlations are hard to establish due largely to people's unwillingness to provide accurate information on whether or not they vote based on material influence (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In recent times, some voters do consider other factors such as past records of politicians, even when attempts are made by the latter to 'buy' the former's choice at elections (Weghorst & Lindberg, 2011;Gadjanova, 2017). Also, we do not claim that campus distributive campaigns are the root causes of vote buying in intra-party and thus national elections, as the campus-party link is a latter development (especially from the 90s and 2000s competitive political period, up to today), and thus the campus-party link is younger than the long history of electoral politics in Ghana.…”

Subjective well‐being and political participation: Empirical evidence from Ghana

“…Due to the pervasiveness of poverty and its concomitant economic struggles among Ghanaians (Adjasi & Osei, ; Booysen, Van Der Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz, & Du Rand, ), it may be that dissatisfied people decide not to vote because of their focus on their survival needs (Inglehart, ; Maslow, ). However, there is replete evidence of vote buying in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa (Bratton, ; Kramon, ; Gadjanova, ). Because poor people are usually more disproportionately targeted for vote buying (Jensen & Justesen, ), these people may be lured to turn out and vote.…”