Effort reduction of employer‐to‐employer changers: Empirical evidence from football

Abstract

We investigate changes in effort investment of employees who still fulfill a contract with their current employer but already signed a follow‐up contract with a new employer (employer‐to‐employer change). Because effort and outside contract assignments are hard to measure in firms, we use running data from professional football (n = 26,577) to proxy effort decisions. Fixed effect regressions reveal a statistically significant but weak reduction in a player's effort after signing a follow‐up contract with a new club. Because we find a statistically significant effort reduction in public sports, this effect might be even larger in less transparent labor markets.

Information effects of managerial turnover on effort and performance: Evidence from the German Bundesliga

“…As measure of effort, we use the running distance covered by the team per match. This is in line with previous studies that use running distance as a measure of effort (e.g., Schneemann & Deutscher, 2017; Weimar & Scharfenkamp, 2019; Weimar & Wicker, 2017). The distance covered depends, for instance, on the opponents' strength and actual score and increases when the team lags behind; that is, players increase their running performance in order to win (Siegle et al, 2012).…”

“…Thus, a change in the running distance cannot be explained by an increase in players. Finally, individual players reduce their running distance after signing a follow‐up contract with a new club lending further support for the running distance as a good proxy for effort (Weimar & Scharfenkamp, 2019).…”

How do Bookmakers Interpret Running Performance of Teams in Previous Games? Evidence From the Football Bundesliga

“…When comparing the two beta models (Model 2 and Model 5), we find the same effect as it relates to the weighted average difference in distance: Teams who covered more distance on the field in the previous five games than their opponent are expected to have a significantly lower winning probability. Again, bookmakers interpret total distance as a sign of fatigue rather than a sign of effort as previous research in both sports sciences (Bangsbo et al, 2006) and sports economics (Weimar & Scharfenkamp, 2019; Weimar & Wicker, 2017; Wicker et al, 2013) suggests. Bookmakers even seem to think that fatigue is accumulated over five games as the size of the coefficient is much larger in Model 5 compared to Model 2.…”

“…Given the good aerobic fitness level of professional football players (Bangsbo et al, 2006), previous research provided evidence that players are in a position to choose the amount of effort they put forth on the pitch by running more or less. For example, Weimar and Scharfenkamp (2019) documented that players reduce their effort in terms of total distance covered per minute in the remaining games of a season after they have signed a new contract with another team, supporting the notion that total distance covered is rather an indicator of player effort than fatigue. Collectively, these findings suggest that bookmakers, if they were aware of these relationships, would assign teams who covered more distance in previous matches a higher chance of winning the current match, while awarding a lower win probability to teams who have performed many intensive runs.…”

Contracts, pay and performance in the sport of kings: Evidence from horse racing

“…These intermediate players were found to exert higher levels of effort in order to gain selection to the national team squad. Recently, using distance run as a proxy for effort, Weimar and Scharfenkamp (2019) report a reduction in player exertion once a contract has been agreed with an outside agent. While this effect does not spread to the team, the authors argue for more nuanced contract design so that incentive mechanisms can be employed as a contract runs out in order to maximize player effort.…”