This work analyzes if reference dependence and loss aversion can explain the puzzling low adoption rates of rainfall index insurance. We present a model that predicts the impact of loss aversion on index insurance demand to vary with different levels of insurance understanding. Index insurance demand of farmers who are unaware of the loss-hedging benefit that insurance provides decreases with loss aversion. In contrast, insurance demand of farmers who are aware of the loss-hedging benefit increases with loss aversion. The model further predicts that farmers who are unaware of the loss-hedging benefit will not demand an even highly subsidized index insurance. Using data from a randomized controlled trial involving a sample of Indian farmers we provide empirical support for our core conjecture that insurance understanding mitigates the negative impact of loss aversion on index insurance adoption.
Managerial turnover induces an information loss regarding managers' knowledge about subordinates' abilities that might increase subordinates' incentives to exhibit effort to impress the new manager. To identify how this affects short‐term performance, we analyze within‐season coach turnovers in the German Bundesliga and consider low and high information loss by differentiating between insider and outsider successors. We use a generalized version of the synthetic control method to construct an accurate counterfactual scenario ensuring that results are not simply due to regression‐to‐the‐mean. We find performance improvements for insider and outsider successors, but only outsider successors induce players to exhibit higher effort.
This work analyzes if reference dependence and loss aversion can explain the puzzling low adoption rates of rainfall index insurance. We present a model that predicts the impact of loss aversion on index insurance demand to vary with different levels of insurance understanding. Index insurance demand of farmers who are unaware of the loss-hedging benefit that insurance provides decreases with loss aversion. In contrast, insurance demand of farmers who are aware of the loss-hedging benefit increases with loss aversion. The model further predicts that farmers who are unaware of the loss-hedging benefit will not demand an even highly subsidized index insurance. Using data from a randomized controlled trial involving a sample of Indian farmers we provide empirical support for our core conjecture that insurance understanding mitigates the negative impact of loss aversion on index insurance adoption.
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