Efficient Vote Authorization in Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting

Schläpfer, Michael; Haenni, Rolf; Koenig, Reto E.; Spycher, Oliver

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_5

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This scheme, however, is unsuited for practical use, due to the fact, that its performance is O(N 2 ) with N as the number of eligible voters. Therefore, a number of works have presented the improvements to the JCJ system, that preserve the coercion-resistance properties while achieving linear complexity -among others, approaches based upon group signatures [2], panic passwords [10], concurrent ballot authorization [15], anonymity sets [34] or using the voter roll [38]. Furthermore, several improvements focused on improving other shortcomings in JCJ scheme, such as addressing the issue of board flooding [26], or improving usability with using tamper-resistant smartcards [29].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Kulyk

Teague

Volkamer

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Kulyk

Teague

Volkamer

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Under these assumptions, it is strongly resistant to coercion, and is fully verifiable by voters and observers. Several variants of JCJ/Civitas improve the usability of the aspects related to verifiability [9], [21] and coercion-resistance [11].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Caveat Coercitor: Coercion-Evidence in Electronic Voting

Grewal

Ryan

Bursuc

et al. 2013

2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

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The balance between coercion-resistance, election verifiability and usability remains unresolved in remote electronic voting despite significant research over the last few years. We propose a change of perspective, replacing the requirement of coercion-resistance with a new requirement of coercionevidence: there should be public evidence of the amount of coercion that has taken place during a particular execution of the voting system. We provide a formal definition of coercion-evidence that has two parts. Firstly, there should be a coercion-evidence test that can be performed against the bulletin board to accurately determine the degree of coercion that has taken place in any given run. Secondly, we require coercer independence, that is the ability of the voter to follow the protocol without being detected by the coercer. To show how coercion-evidence can be achieved, we propose a new remote voting scheme, Caveat Coercitor, and we prove that it satisfies coercion-evidence. Moreover, Caveat Coercitor makes weaker trust assumptions than other remote voting systems, such as JCJ/Civitas and Helios, and has better usability properties.

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“…[24]. Several works such as [21,18,1,17,14,28,3,25] have developed weaker, more practical or more efficient ways to realize coercion-resistance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

Jamroga

Tabatabaei

2017

Electronic Voting

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We present a game-theoretic approach to coercion-resistance from the point of view of an honest election authority that chooses between various protection methods with different levels of resistance and different implementation costs. We give a simple game model of the election and propose a preliminary analysis. It turns out that, in the games that we look at, Stackelberg equilibrium for the society does not coincide with maxmin, and it is always more attractive to the society than Nash equilibrium. This suggests that the society is better off if the security policy is publicly announced, and the authorities commit to it. 3 The definition was game-based in the technical sense, i.e., the security property was defined as the outcome of an abstract game between the "verifier" and the "adversary". In this paper, we use game models to study the interaction between the actual participants of the protocol.

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Efficient Vote Authorization in Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting

Cited by 12 publications

References 11 publications

Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

Caveat Coercitor: Coercion-Evidence in Electronic Voting

Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

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