Abstract. Remote electronic voting has attracted increasing attention in cryptographic research. A promising protocol presented by Juels et al. is currently widely discussed. Although it offers a remarkably high degree of coercion-resistance under reasonable assumptions, it can not be employed in practice due to its poor efficiency. The improvements that have been proposed either require stronger trust assumptions or turned out to be insecure. In this paper, we present an enhancement of the protocol, which runs in linear time without changing the underlying trust assumptions.
Photoinitiated Polymerization of TPGDA was initiated with a NIR LED emitting at 790 nm using a redox based photoinitiator system comprising a cyanine as photosensitizer and a diaryl iodonium salt.
Abstract. Some years ago, Juels et al. introduced the first coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol. Its basic concept is still the most viable approach to address voter coercion and vote selling in Internet voting. However, one of the main open issues is its unrealistic computational requirements of the quadratic-time tallying procedure. In this paper, we examine the cause of this issue, namely the authorization of votes, and summarize the most recent proposals to perform this step in linear time. We explain the key underlying concepts of these proposals and introduce a new protocol based on anonymity sets. The size of these anonymity sets serves as an adjustable security parameter, which determines the degree of coercion-resistance. The main advantage of the new protocol is to move computational complexity introduced in recent works from the voter side to the tallying authority side.
In many software applications, users access application data using graphical user interfaces (GUIs). There is an important, but little explored, link between visualization and security: when the application data is protected by an access control policy, the GUI should be aware of this and respect the policy. For example, the GUI should not display options to users for actions that they are not authorized to execute on application data. Taking this idea one step further, the application GUI should not just be security-aware, it should also be smart. For example, the GUI should not display options to users for opening other widgets when these widgets will only display options for actions that the users are not authorized to execute on application data. We establish this link between visualization and security using a model-driven development approach. Namely, we define and implement a many-models-to-model transformation that, given a security-design model and a GUI model, makes the GUI model both security-aware and smart.
One of the main open issues in electronic government is the fact that the individual users' multi-purpose computing platforms are used. In terms of security, no guarantee is given since these platforms are not under the government authority's control. Even worse, the number of malware infected computing platforms increases. This so-called Secure Platform Problem and approaches aiming to solve it are objects of investigation in this work. We define criteria that need to be ensured to address this problem. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy to classify existing approaches. Based on the classification and the criteria, we analyze the different types of approaches by providing concrete examples. Hereby, we show that none of the existing approaches fully meets our criteria. Thereby, we focus on the most security critical class of electronic government services, namely electronic voting over the Internet. However, most of the discussed approaches as well as the criteria and classification can also be applied to other governmental applications.
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