Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

Jamroga, Wojciech; Tabatabaei, Masoud

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-52240-1_1

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…In [5], two voting systems were compared using zero-sum two-player games based on attack trees, with the payoffs representing the success of coercion. In [12], a simple game-theoretic model of preventing coercion was proposed and analyzed using Nash equilibrium, maxmin, and Stackelberg equilibrium. The authors of [22] applied Stackelberg games to prevent manipulation of elections, focussing on the computational complexity of preventing Denial of Service attacks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pretty Good Strategies for Benaloh Challenge

Jamroga

2023

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Benaloh challenge allows the voter to audit the encryption of her vote, and in particular to check whether the vote has been represented correctly. An interesting analysis of the mechanism has been presented by Culnane and Teague. The authors propose a natural game-theoretic model of the interaction between the voter and a corrupt, malicious encryption device. Then, they claim that there is no “natural” rational strategy for the voter to play the game. In consequence, the authorities cannot provide the voter with a sensible auditing strategy, which undermines the whole idea.Here, we claim the contrary, i.e., that there exist simple rational strategies that justify the usefulness of Benaloh challenge.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pretty Good Strategies for Benaloh Challenge

Jamroga

2023

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Moreover, to our best knowledge, the idea of measuring the security level by the complexity of strategies needed to preserve a given security requirement is entirely new. Other (somewhat) related works include social-technical modeling of attacks with timed automata [15] and especially game-theoretic analysis of voting procedures [9,14,2,23]. Also, strategies for human users to obtain simple security requirements were investigated in [3].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols

Jamroga¹,

Kurpiewski²,

Malvone³

2020

Preprint

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Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted. In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult and costly to use are often ignored by the users, and do not really defend the system against possible attacks. Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of the user's strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level to which a security property ϕ is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a) the complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make ϕ true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The simpler and cheaper to obtain ϕ, the higher the degree of security. We demonstrate how the idea works in a case study based on an electronic voting scenario. To this end, we model the vVote implementation of the Prêt à Voter voting protocol for coercion-resistant and voter-verifiable elections. Then, we identify "natural" strategies for the voter to obtain receipt-freeness, and measure the voter's effort that they require. We also look at how hard it is for the coercer to compromise the election through a randomization attack.

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“…In [5], two voting systems were compared using zero-sum two-player games based on attack trees, with the payoffs representing the success of coercion. In [13], a simple game-theoretic model of preventing coercion was proposed and analyzed using Nash equilibrium, maxmin, and Stackelberg equilibrium. The authors of [25] applied Stackelberg games to prevent manipulation of elections, focussing on the computational complexity of preventing Denial of Service attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity

Jamroga

Tabatabaei

2016

Security and Trust Management

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Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. Even in models where each piece of information is classified as either sensitive or insensitive, the classification is "hardwired" and given as a parameter of the analysis, rather than derived from more fundamental features of the system. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compromising the correct behavior of the system. To formalize this, we first show how two information flows can be compared by looking at the adversary's ability to harm the system. Then, we propose that the information flow in a system is effectively information-secure if it does not allow for more harm than its idealized variant based on the classical notion of noninterference.

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Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

Cited by 7 publications

References 27 publications

Pretty Good Strategies for Benaloh Challenge

Pretty Good Strategies for Benaloh Challenge

Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols

Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity

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