Dynamic Auction for Efficient Competitive Equilibrium under Price Rigidities

Zhu, Jun; Zhang, Dongmo

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25832-9_82

Cited by 5 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…The efficiency concern is also the main motivation behind the study by Zhu and Zhang (2011), where a weakening of the CWE concept was introduced to include so-called "market efficient assignments." This notion of efficiency is based on maximizing a specific sum of individual house valuations and upper price ceilings subject to that preferences are represented by quasi-linear utility functions.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This notion of efficiency is based on maximizing a specific sum of individual house valuations and upper price ceilings subject to that preferences are represented by quasi-linear utility functions. However, even if we restrict the preferences to be quasi-linear, the solution concept suggested by Zhu and Zhang (2011) is fundamentally different from an RPE as, again, a "market efficient" assignment need not respect a given priority structure and Pareto improvements that respect all requirements of their concept may be possible for any given priority structure.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both Talman and Yang (2008) and Zhu and Zhang (2011) provided algorithms that identify their respective solution concepts. In these dynamic processes, the rationing scheme is endogenously determined by the process.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In these dynamic processes, the rationing scheme is endogenously determined by the process. On the other hand, neither Talman and Yang (2008) nor Zhu and Zhang (2011) investigated if their respective mechanisms reach a non-manipulable end state or not. In addition, their sets of "equilibrium price vectors" will, in general, not contain a unique minimal element.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This efficiency notion is the key component in the definition of a rationing price equilibrium. The other components are the standard requirements (see, e.g., Talman and Yang (2008), Zhu and Zhang (2011)) that the prices must belong to the price space, the price of any unassigned house must equal its lower price bound, and the rationing mechanism should only be effective in the special case when the rent that is attached to a house equals its exogenously given ceiling. Given a domain restriction where "almost all" preference profiles are considered, it is demonstrated that the set of rationing price equilibrium price vectors always contains a unique minimal vector.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

2014

Econometrica

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In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non-manipulable for "almost all" preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well-known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework. others. Also, the "kidney exchange problem" resembles a housing market with existing tenants; see Roth, Sönmez, and Unver (2004) for a detailed discussion. The house allocation model with both existing tenants and new applicants was first considered by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999).

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

2014

Econometrica

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Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions

Andersson

Svensson

2018

Games and Economic Behavior

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This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains "almost all" preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions. JEL Classification: C78; D44; D45.

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Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions

Andersson

Svensson

2016

Journal of Economic Theory

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This paper considers a house allocation problem with no initial ownership and where prices are bounded from below and above by exogenously given price restrictions. This type of housing market contains, e.g., the "assignment market" and the "student placement problem" as special cases. A mechanism called the minimal RPE mechanism is defined, and two main results are obtained. First, it is demonstrated that the mechanism is manipulable at some profile in the full preference domain R. Second, it is proved that there is a subsetR ⊂ R of the full domain, containing almost all profiles in R, such that the minimal RPE mechanism is strategy-proof in that subset. JEL Classification: C78; D71.

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Dynamic Auction for Efficient Competitive Equilibrium under Price Rigidities

Cited by 5 publications

References 7 publications

Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions

Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions

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