Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control

Abstract

In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non-manipulable for "almost all" preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well-known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework. others. Also, the "kidney exchange problem" resembles a housing market with existing tenants; see Roth, Sönmez, and Unver (2004) for a detailed discussion. The house allocation model with both existing tenants and new applicants was first considered by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999).

The 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics

“…Надграждайки изследване на Kelso и Crawford (1982), Hatfield и Milgrom (2005) например въвеждат общ модел на съчетаване с договори, който обхваща няколко известни двустранни модела на съчетаване и на търгове (вж. също Andersson and Svensson, 2014;Echenique, 2012;Fleiner, 2003). Това проучване води до създаването на нови приложения на дизайна на пазарни механизми, вкл.…”