No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This paper introduces an axiomatic model for bargaining analysis. We describe a bargaining situation in propositional logic and represent bargainers' preferences in total pre-orders. Based on the concept of minimal simultaneous concessions, we propose a solution to n-person bargaining problems and prove that the solution is uniquely characterized by five logical axioms: Consistency, Comprehensiveness, Collective rationality, Disagreement, and Contraction independence. This framework provides a naive solution to multi-person, multi-issue bargaining problems in discrete domains. Although the solution is purely qualitative, it can also be applied to continuous bargaining problems through a procedure of discretization, in which case the solution coincides with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Abstract. As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language (GDL) and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such, problems that require reasoning about games can be solved by the standard methods for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation: first, we formalise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming.

No abstract

This paper presents some key strategies applied in jackaroo agent. Most of the strategies are rooted in theoretical modelling and statistic analysis of TAC-03 SCM game. We model the product market with a variation of Cournot game and specify the component market by constant-supply model. We outline the basic theory and algorithms dealing with component procuring, product pricing, production scheduling and price forecasting.

Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers preferences. We represent bargainers demands in propositional logic and bargainers preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity