Duration Perception Versus Perception Duration: A Proposed Model for the Consciously Experienced Moment

Abstract

Duration perception is not the same as perception duration. Time is an object of perception in its own right and is qualitatively different to exteroceptive or interoceptive perception of concrete objects or sensations originating within the self. In reviewing evidence for and against the experienced moment, White (2017, Psychol. Bull., 143, 735–756) proposed a model of global integration of information dense envelopes of integration. This is a valuable addition to the literature because it supposes that, like Tononi’s (2004, BMC Neurosci., 5, 42) Integrated Information Theory, consciousness is an integral step above perception of objects or the self. Consciousness includes the perception of abstract contents such as time, space, and magnitude, as well as post-perceptual contents drawn from memory. The present review takes this logic a step further and sketches a potential neurobiological pathway through the salience, default mode, and central executive networks that culminates in a candidate model of how duration perception and consciousness arises. Global integration is viewed as a process of Bayesian Prediction Error Minimisation according to a model put forward by Hohwy, Paton and Palmer (2016, Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci., 15, 315–335) called ‘distrusting the present’. The proposed model also expresses global integration as an intermediate stage between perception and memory that spans an approximate one second duration, an analogue of Wittmann’s (2011, Front. Integr. Neurosci., 5, 66) experienced moment.

Systema Temporis: A time-based dimensional framework for consciousness and cognition

“…Categorising forms of cognition and consciousness according to time offers a way to visualise: 1) the consolidation and cognitive manipulation of immediate multisensory input up through progressively, temporally-extended modes of memory; and 2) forms of time consciousness ranging through immediate phenomenal experience, extended wakefulness, and self-consciousness. As established by Kent (2019)…”

“…Attention is generally conceived as either endogenous (i.e., driven by to-down cognitive processes) and exogneous (i.e., driven by bottom-up perceptual processes) (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). These processes are approximated by bottom-up multisensory activity of the salience network and the top-down attentional control of the central executive network (Baddeley, 2012;Craig, 2009b (Kent, 2019;Lloyd, 2012). Importantly, this distinction also applies to temporal structure given the dissociation between functional moments of the salience network, mental presence of the central executive network, and experienced moment associated with the default mode network (Kent, 2019;Montemayor & Wittmann, 2014;Wittmann, 2011).…”

“…These processes are approximated by bottom-up multisensory activity of the salience network and the top-down attentional control of the central executive network (Baddeley, 2012;Craig, 2009b (Kent, 2019;Lloyd, 2012). Importantly, this distinction also applies to temporal structure given the dissociation between functional moments of the salience network, mental presence of the central executive network, and experienced moment associated with the default mode network (Kent, 2019;Montemayor & Wittmann, 2014;Wittmann, 2011). They are also dissociated in Bayesian terms related to the sensory likelihood (salience), prior (central executive), and posterior (default mode) distributions and their relation to time perception, attention, and consciousness (Hohwy, 2012;Kent, Van Doorn, Hohwy, & Klein, 2019;.…”

Time Dilation and Acceleration in Depression

“…Production tasks are uniquely reliant on generating an interval 'subjectively', as it were, from a verbal cue (Bschor et al, 2004). The model illustrated in Figure 1, above, proposes that interoceptive cues produced by the salience network, such as heartbeat and breathing rate, create synchronous emotional moments that are then integrated into the temporal flow of conscious experience by the default mode network (Craig, 2009;Kent, 2019). Activity in the default mode network has been associated with awareness of time (Lloyd, 2012), subjective time dilation (van TIME…”

“…Consciousness is defined here as the subjectivity experienced by conscious beings, which is in contrast to Chalmers' (1996) non-conscious, hypothetical zombies. According to a model proposed by Kent (2019; see Figure 1), the experienced moment is distinct from Wittmann's (2011) shorter timescale functional moments and longer timescale mental presence primarily because: (a) it is a mode of duration perception as opposed to either the sensory-perceptual synchronization of functional moments or extended duration of mental presence; (b) of its reliance on the default mode network as opposed to the salience or central executive networks; and (c) of its critical range of activity being between 200 -1250 ms, as opposed to shorter or longer timescales of perceptual (< 200 ms) and working memory (< 30 -100 s) processes (Kent, 2019). Functional moments are discrete units of time in the milliseconds range that are perceived of as simultaneous and define temporal resolution within a particular sensory modality (Craig, 2009).…”