Dual-ranking act-consequentialism

Portmore, Douglas W.

doi:10.1007/s11098-006-9059-7

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…9 Among other variables, this function may include the nature of your personal relationship interactions, the intensity of your relationship, and whether your relationship is one-directional or reciprocal. Your intimates such as your family members or friends are closer to you in moral space than strangers by virtue of the positive personal relationship that 7 Portmore (2008), p. 411. This asymmetry was first introduced by Stocker (1976), section 2, and later more extensively explored by Slote (1985), ch.…”

Section: Suppose Next That Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The locus classicus for a defence of an agent-centred prerogative isScheffler (1982). Other defences of options, though by no means exhaustive, areSider (1993),Portmore (2003;2008), and Bader (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This is by far the most common picture of options. Theorists that rely on this picture areKagan (1989),Scheffler (1982),Sider (1993), andPortmore (2006;2008).13 Early discussions of this permission are inParfit (1977),Davis (1980), andScheffler (1982).…”

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Other‐Sacrificing Options*

Lange

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates.

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Section: Suppose Next That Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Other‐Sacrificing Options*

Lange

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…A world theoretic framework or analogue has been used widely in pure deontic logic (see e.g. Hilpinen 1971, andHorty 2001), at its interface with ethical theory (Feldman 1986), as well as in ethical theory (Portmore 2008). 27 That is, for any agent and world, we will assume that we have a world-relative ordering relation, ≥ i that is confined to the i-acceptable worlds (a simplification), all such worlds are comparable (so reflexive), and the relation is transitive.…”

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Supererogation, inside and out: Toward an adequate scheme for common-sense morality1

McNamara¹

2011

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1

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“…47 47 This assumption would explain why it is, on SU, always morally permissible to do what will be best for others overall, for, arguably, it is always morally permissible to do what one has most moral reason to do. For more on this point, see Portmore (forthcoming). In that article, I argue that it is both always permissible to do what one has most moral reason to do and always permissible to do what one has at least as much reason, all things considered, to do.…”

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Consequentializing Moral Theories

Portmore

2007

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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To consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic statuses of actions and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. I explain the motivation for the consequentializing project and defend it against recent criticisms by Mark Schroeder and others.Broadly construed, maximizing act-consequentialism (hereafter, simply "consequentialism") is the view that all acts are permissible or impermissible solely in virtue of how their outcomes rank relative to those of the available alternatives on some transitive, evaluative ordering of outcomes such that an act is permissible if and only if no available alternative outcome ranks higher than its outcome on that ordering. 1 An act's outcome is also to be construed broadly so as to include everything that would be the case were the act to be performed. 2 When "consequentialism" and "outcome" are both construed broadly, it turns out, as I will later argue, that any remotely plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. The recipe for consequentializing a non-consequentialist theory is simple: Take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic status of an action and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields -that is, for any deontic predicate ("permissible," "impermissible," "obligatory," "supererogatory," etc.), the resulting consequentialist

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Dual-ranking act-consequentialism

Cited by 13 publications

References 14 publications

Other‐Sacrificing Options*

Other‐Sacrificing Options*

Supererogation, inside and out: Toward an adequate scheme for common-sense morality1

Consequentializing Moral Theories

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