“… In addition to these necessary conditions, some claim that only praiseworthy acts are supererogatory. (E.g., McNamara , 203, Mellema , 17, and Montague , 102) while David Heyd claims that only acts performed with altruistic intentions can be supererogatory (1982, 115). See Archer Forthcoming a, for an argument against the first view, and Archer for an argument against the second.…”
It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and examine their limitation. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favor of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View.
“… In addition to these necessary conditions, some claim that only praiseworthy acts are supererogatory. (E.g., McNamara , 203, Mellema , 17, and Montague , 102) while David Heyd claims that only acts performed with altruistic intentions can be supererogatory (1982, 115). See Archer Forthcoming a, for an argument against the first view, and Archer for an argument against the second.…”
It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and examine their limitation. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favor of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View.
“…The view that there is a necessary connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness is widely accepted in the philosophical literature. Gregory Mellema (, p. 17) claims that part of how “the concept of supererogation is standardly defined” is that “the performance of the act is morally praiseworthy.” Similarly, Paul McNamara (, p. 203) includes in what he calls the “Standard Analysis” of supererogation the condition that “the actions … are those which their agents are praiseworthy (in varying degrees) for performing.” Following Mellema and McNamara I will define the standard account of the connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness in the following way: The Standard Analysis : Necessarily, if an act ϕ is supererogatory then an agent who performs ϕ will be worthy of praise for ϕ‐ing.It is important to get clear on what those who defend some form of the Standard Analysis are claiming. First, this is a view about moral praiseworthiness.…”
Section: The Standard Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, while this claim may seem right at first look, according to McNamara, it should be rejected. According to McNamara (, p. 209), an act can be morally good, even the morally best act available, without being praiseworthy, as praiseworthiness also involves an assessment of the agent. Of course, how someone acts plays an important role in establishing whether she is praiseworthy or not.…”
Section: Does Beyond Duty Entail Praiseworthiness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, McNamara (, p. 208) claims it is possible to perform an act that goes beyond duty but fails to be praiseworthy . To see this consider the following example: Cunning Candidate : Jane is a power hungry misanthrope standing for election as mayor.…”
Section: Does Beyond Duty Entail Praiseworthiness?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This in turn will open up a need for new deontic categories to capture the range of deontic possibilities. Paul McNamara and Shlomo Cohen have both argued that the existence of a necessary connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness presents us with a need to create new deontic categories to capture the range of possible options (McNamara, ; Mellema, ; Cohen, forthcoming). I will argue such arguments are premature, as no such connection exists.…”
Section: Does Beyond Duty Entail Praiseworthiness?mentioning
It is commonly assumed that praiseworthiness should form part of the analysis of supererogation. I will argue that this view should be rejected. I will start by arguing that, at least on some views of the connection between moral value and praiseworthiness, it does not follow from the fact that acts of supererogation go beyond what is required by duty that they will always be praiseworthy to perform. I will then consider and dismiss what I will call the Argument from Stipulation in favour of holding that acts of supererogation are always praiseworthy. Next, I will examine what I will call the Necessary Connection Argument, which posits a necessary connection between supererogation and praiseworthiness. I will argue that the intuitions used to motivate this argument are best explained by a debunking explanation.
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