Drug policy and federalism

Konrad, Kai A.

doi:10.1007/bf01047947

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Governments of local jurisdictions generally do not act in isolation, passively suffering from, or imposing externalities on others, but they interact strategically along many dimensions, including tax rates (for reviews, see Wilson 1999;Fuest, Huber and Mintz 2005), welfare benefit levels (for a review, see Brueckner 2003), environmental standards (e.g., Oates and Schwab 1988;Fredriksson and Millimet 2002), drug policy (e.g., Konrad 1994) and law enforcement (for a review, see Teichmann 2005). Also, the interdependence may derive from various sources (which are empirically hard to disentangle e.g., Brueckner 2003;Allers and Elhorst 2005;Werck, Heyndels and Geys 2008).…”

Section: Losses From Suboptimal Task Assignmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Geys¹,

Konrad²

2010

Handbook on Multi-Level Governance

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Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance by Benny Geys and Kai A. Konrad Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that describe the allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of government. In this paper, we present a short and selective survey of the development of the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties along the vertical dimension in federations. We thereby first discuss the multiple trade-offs brought forward in the literature; these make that an ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of government may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Then we turn to the consequences of a sub-optimal allocation of tasks and discuss spillover effects, strategic interactions between jurisdictions and intergovernmental competition. Throughout the review, we highlight paths in need of further research such that, in time, we will have a more solid ground for policy advice.

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Section: Losses From Suboptimal Task Assignmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Geys¹,

Konrad²

2010

Handbook on Multi-Level Governance

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“…We find that due to the negative externalities from implementing domestic law enforcement policies in downstream markets the location of these policies matter. Konrad (1994) explores why rational local governments use supply restricting drug policies (i.e. prohibition) to fight the illicit drug industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies

Naranjo

2010

International Review of Law and Economics

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“…Governments of local jurisdictions generally do not act in isolation, passively suffering from, or imposing externalities on others, but they interact strategically along many dimensions, including tax rates (for reviews, see Wilson 1999;Fuest, Huber and Mintz 2005), welfare benefit levels (for a review, see Brueckner 2003), environmental standards (e.g., Oates and Schwab 1988;Fredriksson and Millimet 2002), drug policy (e.g., Konrad 1994) and law enforcement (for a review, see Teichmann 2005). Also, the interdependence may derive from various sources (which are empirically hard to disentangle e.g., Brueckner 2003; Allers and Elhorst 2005;Werck, Heyndels and Geys 2008).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Konrad

Geys

2010

SSRN Journal

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Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that describe the allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of government. In this paper, we present a short and selective survey of the development of the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties along the vertical dimension in federations. We thereby first discuss the multiple trade-offs brought forward in the literature; these make that an ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of government may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Then we turn to the consequences of a sub-optimal allocation of tasks and discuss spillover effects, strategic interactions between jurisdictions and intergovernmental competition. Throughout the review, we highlight paths in need of further research such that, in time, we will have a more solid ground for policy advice. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Föderalismus und optimale Allokation über RegierungsebenenStaaten unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich ihres Regierungsaufbaus und ihren Verteilungsregeln von Aufgaben, Rechten und Pflichten über die verschiedenen Regierungsebenen hinweg. In diesem Artikel stellen wir eine kurze und selektive Übersicht über die Entwicklung der Theorie der optimalen Allokation von Rechten und Pflichten entlang der vertikalen Dimension in Staatenbünden vor. Wir diskutieren dabei zuerst die vielfachen, in der Literatur beschriebenen, Trade-offs. Diese führen dazu, dass eine ideale Verteilung der tatsächlichen Aufgaben schwierig, wenn nicht unmöglich zu erzielen ist. Als nächstes wenden wir uns den Konsequenzen der sub-optimalen Aufgabenverteilung zu und diskutieren externe Effekte, strategische Interaktionen zwischen den verschiedenen Gebietskörperschaften und zwischenstaatlichen Wettbewerb. Im gesamten Überblicksartikel stellen wir mögliche Pfade für notwendige weitere Forschung heraus, mit der für die Zukunft eine solide Grundlage für Politikberatung gelegt werden kann.1

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Drug policy and federalism

Cited by 6 publications

References 15 publications

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

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