Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance

Abstract

Federalism and Optimal Allocation Across Levels of Governance by Benny Geys and Kai A. Konrad Countries differ in their governmental architectures and in the rules that describe the allocation of tasks, rights and duties across the various levels of government. In this paper, we present a short and selective survey of the development of the theory of optimal allocation of rights and duties along the vertical dimension in federations. We thereby first discuss the multiple trade-offs brought forward in the literature; these make that an ideal allocation of actual tasks across levels of government may be difficult, if not impossible, to attain. Then we turn to the consequences of a sub-optimal allocation of tasks and discuss spillover effects, strategic interactions between jurisdictions and intergovernmental competition. Throughout the review, we highlight paths in need of further research such that, in time, we will have a more solid ground for policy advice.

The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law

“…It also helps allocating powers in terms of power-sharing among different layers beyond federalism. 155 The five-storey house, informed by the idea that all layers of governance are of equal importance and reflect human interaction, does not have a preference for one layer over the other, but recognises the international level as equally importance and valuable, often indispensable in the pursuit of CCH, playing an important part next to domestic layers. For example, climate change as a CCH is not confined to global efforts of the international community, but bears out on all layers of government, including local rules on construction or traffic.…”

Urban sustainability transitions in a context of multi-level governance: A comparison of four European states

“…In the context of multi-level governance, these strategies and activities flow in a horizontal as well as a vertical direction (Geys and Konrad, 2011;Kern, 2014;Lee and Koski, 2015;Peters and Pierre, 2004;Rosenau, 2004). In a horizontal direction, the exchanges and knowledge flows between different city-regions are manifold (Derthick, 2010;Geys and Konrad, 2011;Lee and Koski, 2015). They are furthered by transnational municipal networks and environmental movements.…”

“…This question of how tasks, rights and responsibilities should be allocated among different levels of governance has received ample attention in the literature (Geys and Konrad, 2011). Oates' Decentralization Theorem suggests that the responsibility for public services should be assigned to the lowest level where both the benefits and the costs of these services are generated (Oates, 1999).…”

“…This argument is the reasoning behind the principle of subsidiarity. It assumes that the sub-national and local governments are closer and, thus, more responsive to the needs of local communities than national governments are (Geys and Konrad, 2011;Oates, 1999). This argument has also been used to justify the increasing attention of transition scholars to the urban sustainability transitions (e.g.…”

Public employment services under decentralization: Evidence from a natural experiment

“…This paper speaks to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to fiscal federalism research that has analyzed whether states should provide public goods and services at a centralized or decentralized level (see Geys and Konrad, 2010, for a review). Thus far, this literature has almost exclusively investigated decentralization with respect to public finances, education policies, environmental policies or political institutions.…”