Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies

Naranjo, Alberto

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2010.07.001

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As a final point, note that the above problems are for the most part due to the overlapping‐jurisdiction nature of maritime piracy. Thus, similar problems presumably arise in other multi‐jurisdiction law enforcement settings, such as enforcement of anti‐drug laws Naranjo () and Poret (), and prosecution of the “global war on terror.”…”

Section: Enforcement Of Anti‐piracy Lawsmentioning

confidence: 94%

An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

Hallwood

Miceli

2013

Scottish J Political Eco

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Modern-day piracy on the high seas poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. Implementation of optimal enforcement policies is complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problems therefore impede the effectiveness of current international laws against piracy.

show abstract

Section: Enforcement Of Anti‐piracy Lawsmentioning

confidence: 94%

An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

Hallwood

Miceli

2013

Scottish J Political Eco

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In this paper, the systemic link is the one assumed to be the most important in understanding the relationship between drug markets and violence. Assuming the systemic link between violence and illegal drug markets, in the past decade, the literature has made emphasis on the effect of violence over drug prices trying to understand the puzzle about lower drug prices together with large investments in supplyoriented anti-drug policies (Donohue and Levitt 1998;Burrus 1999;Poret 2003;Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006;Naranjo and Jacobsson 2009;Naranjo 2011) but has left the issue of the interplay between drug market and turf competition and its impact on violence unstudied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Naranjo

2015

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Street-level illegal drug markets generate much of the violence and intimidation that local communities face nowadays. These markets are mainly driven by territorial gangs who finance their activities through the sale of drugs. Understanding how the existence of both turf and drug market competition may have unintended consequences of law enforcement policies on violence is the main contribution of the paper. We propose a two-stage game-theoretical model where two profit maximizing gangs compete in prices and invest in guns. We find that policies such as traditional or community policing can have different and unexpected effects on the level of violence.

show abstract

Piracy, Modern Maritime

Hallwood¹,

Miceli²

2019

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies

Cited by 11 publications

References 19 publications

An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

Turf and Illegal Drug Market Competition between Gangs

Piracy, Modern Maritime

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About