Dreams and reality monitoring.

Abstract

Experiment 1 tested the counterintuitive prediction that memories for one's own dreams should not be particularly easy to discriminate from memories for someone else's dreams. Pairs of people reported dreams to each other that they had either dreamed, read, or made up the night before. On a test requiring subjects to discriminate events they had reported from those reported by their partner, subjects had more difficulty with real dreams than with dreams they read or made up. Experiment 2 provided evidence that real dreams do not simply produce overall weaker memories; the deficit for dreams was eliminated with more time to respond and with more detailed cues. In addition, subjects' ratings of various characteristics of their memories (e.g., vividness, personal relevance) indicated that dreams were not generally weaker or impoverished. The results are interpreted within the framework for reality monitoring described by Johnson and Raye (1981): Memories for real dreams are proposed to be deficient in conscious cognitive operations that help identify the origin of information generated in a waking state. At the same time, real dreams are embedded in a network of supporting memories that can be drawn on for reality monitoring decisions under appropriate circumstances. Finally, a comparison of recognition and recall indicated that dreams may leave persisting memories that are difficult to access via free recall.

Disowned recollections: Denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

“…Rather, these reports are the result also of subjective metacognitive judgments, crucial for deciding whether a mental event is indeed a memory for experiences from one's past (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989;Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996;Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002;Nelson & Narens, 1990). For example, judgments are at the core of the Source Monitoring Framework-which has shown that the subjective characteristics of mental experiences influence metacognitive decision-making (Johnson et al, 1993;Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988;Johnson, Kahan, & Raye, 1984)-and also of the remember/know distinction used in much memory research (e.g., Lövdén, Rönnlund, & Nilsson, 2002;Tulving, 1985).…”

Evaluating the Credibility of Statements Given by Persons With Intellectual Disability. [Evaluación de la credibilidad de relatos de personas con discapacidad intelectual]

“…Based on their proposals, numerous research studies have been conducted to explore the characteristics that differentiate statements of varying origin, such as memories of actual events, imagination, dreams, fantasies, lies, or false memories derived from post-event information (Diges, 1995;Henkel, Franklin, & Johnson, 2000;Johnson, 1988;Johnson, Kahan, & Raye, 1984;Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988;Lindsay & Johnson, 1989;Manzanero, 2006Manzanero, , 2009Manzanero & Diges, 1995;Manzanero, El-Astal, & Aróz-tegui, 2009;Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus, 1986;.…”

Memory confusions for real and imagined completions of symmetrical visual patterns

“…If the image is elicited with considerable reflection, effort, or elaboration, then the internally generated memory should be easier to distinguish from that for an external event than if the image is elicited naturally or spontaneously. Johnson, Kahan, and Raye (1984) found, for example, that people experience more confusion in reality monitoring for their actual dreams than for dreams they simply make up. Presumably, memories for real dreams contain less information about the cognitive operations used in the generation process, making them harder to distinguish from memories for perceived events.…”