A framework for understanding source monitoring and relevant empirical evidence is described, and several related phenomena are discussed: old-new recognition, indirect tests, eyewitness testimony, misattributed familiarity, cryptomnesia, and incorporation of fiction into fact. Disruptions in source monitoring (e.g., from confabulation, amnesia, and aging) and the brain regions that are involved are also considered, and source monitoring within a general memory architecture is discussed. It is argued that source monitoring is based on qualities of experience resulting from combinations of perceptual and reflective processes, usually requires relatively differentiated phenomenal experience, and involves attributions varying in deliberateness. These judgments evaluate information according to flexible criteria and are subject to error and disruption. Furthermore, diencephalic and temporal regions may play different roles in source monitoring than do frontal regions of the brain.

People remember information from two basic sources: that derived from external sources (obtained through perceptual processes) and that generated by internal processes such as reasoning, imagination, and thought. Of particular interest to us are the processes people use in deciding whether information initially had an external or an internal source, which we call "reality monitoring." We propose a working model of reality monitoring to account for both discrimination and confusion between memories for thoughts and memories for perceptions. Examples of questions the model addresses are, What types of information are more likely to be represented in memories of external events than in memories of internal events? What cues allow people to decide the origin of a memory? What is the nature of the decision processes involved? Which processes, and under what conditions, are likely to break down and lead to unreliable memory? What assumptions do individuals have about their memory for their thoughts compared to their memory for their perceptions? How accurate are these assumptions? We summarize some research that is encouraging as far as the tractability of some of these problems is concerned and that demonstrates the usefulness of the particular working model proposed here. Both perception of external stimuli and thought produce memories. We have referred to the processes by which a person attributes a memory to an external or an internal source as reality monitoring (Johnson, 1977; Johnson & Raye, Note 1). Of course, in one sense, the memories created by thoughts are no less "real" than those created by perceptual experiences, and the former can be shown to have important consequences; for example, thinking about

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Two studies explored potential bases for reality monitoring of naturally occurring autobiographical events. In Study 1, subjects rated phenomenal characteristics of recent and childhood memories. Compared with imagined events, perceived events were given higher ratings on several characteristics, including perceptual information, contextual information, and supporting memories. This was especially true for recent memories. In Study 2, subjects described how they knew autobiographical events had (or had not) happened. For perceived events, subjects were likely to mention perceptual and contextual details of the memory and to refer to other supporting memories. For imagined events, subjects were likely to engage in reasoning based on prior knowledge. The results are consistent with the idea that reality monitoring draws on differences in qualitative characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined events and augment findings from more controlled laboratory studies of complex events (Johnson & Suengas, in press;Suengas & Johnson, 1988).