Dois Argumentos Pelo Conhecimento Sobre a Ciência No Ensino De Ciências: Por Uma Contraideologia Do Conflito E Um Metaconhecimento Poderoso

Abstract

We present and discuss in this thesis two arguments, based in the works of two leading curriculum theorists, Michael Apple and Michael Young, in defense of knowledge about science in science teaching. After a historical rescue on the recognition of the importance of the history and philosophy of science in science education, we discuss briefly the philosophical criticism over the so-called consensus view of nature of science. We argue that the distance between the debate on the nature of science in science teaching and its mains critics remains far from arguments of social, political and curricular nature, then we stress the need for a explicit political role for the history and philosophy of science in science education. This means take into account broader processes in education, such as the process of commodification of education and science and the waves of ideological valuation and devaluation of science. First, based on critical curriculum theory and in Apple's seminal works and his concept of conflict, we advocate that the tenetstype approach present in the consensus view, by its form, tends to be inviting to standard tests, high-stakes testing, as well to the neoliberal and scientistic-positivist ideologies, inherent in commodification policies. We argue, therefore, that the history of science and the concept of conflict must be understood as a counterideology of conflict against neoliberal and scientistic-positivist ideologies, and their political roles emerge as a resistance to the commodification processes of education. Second, based on Young's recent works and his concept of powerful knowledge, we argue that the content of the consensus view of nature of science is sympathetic to subjectivist visions, resonating with the postmodern epistemic relativism. Thus, our argument is that philosophy of science, guided by a realistic structural social view, should be understood as a powerful metaknowledge, a conceptual proposition based on Young's, against epistemic relativism and localist curricular policies that exclude science. The political nature of our argument is evidenced by the fact that such exclusion violates principles of equity and social justice, translated into the call for minimum guarantee of unrestricted, broad and effective educational access to powerful knowledges. Finally, we discuss tensions between the proposed arguments, as well limitations in our approaches, and point to future developments.

Natureza da Ciência no ensino: entre a pesquisa acadêmica e as orientações oficiais para a educação básica

“…No presente trabalho, adaptamos a metodologia empregada por Olson para analisar como elementos de natureza da ciência aparecem em documentos oficiais. Diferentemente da autora, não consideramos a presença de listas normativas explícitas sobre o que os estudantes devem aprender, visto que essa abordagem acumula críticas a favor e contra, discussão essa que foge ao escopo do presente trabalho, mas são abordadas, entre outros, por Bagdonas, Zanetic e Gurgel (2014), Irzik e Nola (2011), Matthews (2012), Martins (2015) e Moreira (2018).…”

O ensino da Natureza da Ciência como forma de resistência aos movimentos Anticiência: o realismo estrutural como contraponto ao relativismo epistêmico

“…Neste contexto, podemos pensar que se anteriormente a prioridade dos discursos metacientíficos no ensino era combater visões que exageravam as capacidades e potencialidades da ciência, hoje se torna urgente reconhecer criticamente suas virtudes epistêmicas. As pesquisas em Ensino de Ciências, bem como os estudos e ensino de Natureza da Ciência, devem propor alternativas e resistências tanto à valorização quanto à desvalorização extremada da ciência e suas implicações na educação científica (MOREIRA, 2018). Assim, tanto nos contextos filosóficos, políticos e culturais mais amplos, quanto nos atuais debates sobre a Natureza da Ciência, podemos levantar as seguintes questões: o conhecimento científico ainda pode ser considerado confiável, mesmo levando em conta as importantes críticas à ciência moderna feitas por pensadores nos séculos XX e XXI?…”