Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals

Sorensen, Roy

doi:10.2307/2219708

Cited by 64 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…Theoretical remedies to these kinds of specious patterns of reasoning are not especially difficult to locate. Regarding Kripkean Dogmatism, Harman (1973) and Sorensen (1988) point out the irrationality of someone treating her prior belief in or knowledge that P as a fixed, incontrovertible referencepoint for subsequent reasoning. And regarding the disagreement case, Christensen posits a principle he calls Independence, which states that "in evaluating the epistemic credentials of another's expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn't rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P" (Christensen 2011, pp.…”

Section: Overcoming Dogmatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief

DiPaolo¹,

Simpson

2015

Synthese

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People sometimes try to call others' beliefs into question by pointing out the contingent causal origins of those beliefs. The significance of such 'Etiological Challenges' is a topic that has started attracting attention in epistemology. Current work on this topic aims to show that Etiological Challenges are, at most, only indirectly epistemically significant, insofar as they bring other generic epistemic considerations to the agent's attention (e.g. disagreement, consistency with one's own epistemic standards, evidence of one's fallibility). Against this approach, we argue that Etiological Challenges are epistemically significant in a more direct and more distinctive way. An Etiological Challenge prompts the agent to assess whether her beliefs result from practices of indoctrination, and whether she should reduce confidence in those beliefs, given the anti-reliability of indoctrination as a method of belief-acquisition. Our analysis also draws attention to some of the ways in which epistemic concerns interact with political issues-e.g. relating to epistemic injustice, identity-based discrimination, and segregation-when we're thinking about the contingent causal origins of our beliefs.

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Section: Overcoming Dogmatismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief

DiPaolo¹,

Simpson

2015

Synthese

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“…However, there are also cases in which it is quite clear that one is entitled to dismiss considerations that suggest that not-p on the basis of one's belief that p (Sorensen 1988b;Kelly 2008). Consider, for example, the following TRUE STORY.…”

Section: The Ideal and Common Sensementioning

confidence: 99%

“…But one is in no position to reasonably conclude this, once one's knowledge has been undermined. For good discussions of the Kripke-Harman 'dogmatism paradox', see also Sorensen (1988b) and Conee (2001). 20 Although all of the details of the example are nonfictional, the inspiration for using them in this way is due to Crispin Wright (2004).…”

Section: The Ideal and Common Sensementioning

confidence: 99%

Following the argument where it leads

Kelly

2011

Philos Stud

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Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to 'follow the argument where it leads' has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or 'Moorean' responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing.

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“…In developing his theory of epistemic ''blindspots'', Sorensen (1988) provided a sophisticated version of Harman's response to the dogmatism puzzle. Sorensen claims that proposition (4) is one particular instance of a wider class of propositions, which he calls ''junk-conditionals''.…”

Section: Junk Conditionals and Junk Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Dogmatism repuzzled

Spectre

Sharon

2009

Philos Stud

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Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

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Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals

Cited by 64 publications

References 0 publications

Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief

Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief

Following the argument where it leads

Dogmatism repuzzled

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