People sometimes try to call others' beliefs into question by pointing out the contingent causal origins of those beliefs. The significance of such 'Etiological Challenges' is a topic that has started attracting attention in epistemology. Current work on this topic aims to show that Etiological Challenges are, at most, only indirectly epistemically significant, insofar as they bring other generic epistemic considerations to the agent's attention (e.g. disagreement, consistency with one's own epistemic standards, evidence of one's fallibility). Against this approach, we argue that Etiological Challenges are epistemically significant in a more direct and more distinctive way. An Etiological Challenge prompts the agent to assess whether her beliefs result from practices of indoctrination, and whether she should reduce confidence in those beliefs, given the anti-reliability of indoctrination as a method of belief-acquisition. Our analysis also draws attention to some of the ways in which epistemic concerns interact with political issues-e.g. relating to epistemic injustice, identity-based discrimination, and segregation-when we're thinking about the contingent causal origins of our beliefs.
Higher-order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one's beliefs as a result of receiving evidence that those beliefs resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Several philosophers have identified features of higher-order defeat that distinguish it from familiar types of defeat. If higher-order defeat has these features, they are data an account of rational belief must capture. In this article, I identify a new distinguishing feature of higher-order defeat, and I argue that on its own, and in conjunction with the other distinguishing features, it favors an account of higher-order defeat grounded in non-evidential, 'state-given reasons' for belief.What is out of common is usually a guide rather than a hindrance (Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet).
Epistemic trespassers are experts who pass judgment on questions in fields where they lack expertise. What's wrong with epistemic trespassing? I identify several limitations with a seminal analysis to isolate three desiderata on an answer to this question and motivate my own answer. An answer (i) should explain what's wrong in the cases that motivate inquiry into epistemic trespassing, (ii) should explain what's wrong with epistemic trespassing even if trespassers do not acknowledge their trespassing, and (iii) these explanations should not be independent of the fact that epistemic trespassing involves expertise. I also independently motivate a fourth desideratum: (iv) this account should explain the evaluative difference between different kinds of trespassing. To satisfy these desiderata, I develop a social analysis: epistemic trespassing is wrong because it is an abuse of expert authority that neglects novice vulnerabilities.
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