Does Voting Solve the Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma?

Abstract

Does voting solve the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? Do voting rules matter when trying to induce people to collectively select a sustainable alternative that leaves more resources for future generations? To answer these questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment using an intergenerational sustainability dilemma game in which players are asked to choose between two alternatives. Choosing the alternative that maximizes the players’ immediate benefit decreases the resources left for subsequent generations. The choice is made by the votes cast within small groups representing successive generations. We compare three voting rules: ordinary voting, whereby each person in the group has one vote; proxy voting, whereby some but not all of the players are given an extra vote to cast on behalf of subsequent generations; and two-ballot voting, whereby all players are given an extra vote. We observe that both proxy voting and two-ballot voting increase the frequency at which the sustainable alternative is selected; however, the frequency of such a choice remains low. This suggests that voting individually is a relatively ineffective way to elicit sustainable choices from successive generations even if the rules of voting are modified.

Future Design: Bequeathing Sustainable Natural Environments and Sustainable Societies to Future Generations

“…If this is the case, the total number of fish caught is 45; hence the next generation's fish resource is 100. Consider the case a for Katsuki and Hizen [42]. Once I establish that the median of AAB is A, and the median of BBA is B, this matches exactly the majority voting and, apparently, median voting may not work well either.…”

“…Kamijo et al [53] compared the case where the Demeny voting specified that one extra vote was cast for future generations with the case where it did not. Again, they observed no effect due to Demeny voting when that stipulation was not explicitly stated [42]. To mitigate this issue, Hizen [56] suggested the necessity of introducing other systems than voting.…”

“…However, what about democratic voting? Katsuki and Hizen [42] conducted a voting experiment with 156 participants, using the ISDG described by Kamijo et al [35]. Each generation had three participants, and each participant could cast hypothetical votes as a member of one out of six generations.…”

Deliberative Forms of Democracy and Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma

“…For instance, climate change problems shall adversely affect future generations that are not born yet; however, such unborn future generations do not have any means to convey what they want to the current generation in the decision-making process. Several researchers have empirically and experimentally studied IS problems, employing some decision-making models of deliberation and/or voting [3,19,[72][73][74][75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82]. Gronlund et al [22] compare people's knowledge and opinions on long-run energy politics under traditional face-to-face and online deliberation, suggesting that both settings only enhance people's knowledge.…”

“…Timilsina et al [85] conduct field experiments with a subject pool of general people in Nepal and conclude that intergenerational accountability (IA that asks people to be accountable for their decisions to future generations) is effective at maintaining IS. Katsuki and Hizen [81] address people's behaviors under some voting rules in laboratory settings, finding that they fail in enhancing IS. Overall, these studies demonstrate that some attempts and institutions (with deliberation), such as IFG, FAB and IA, shall be able to address underrepresentation of future generations, and also maintain IS.…”