The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels:trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

In this study, we conducted a laboratory experiment to assess preemptive striking by and towards individuals or groups. In the framework of a preemptive strike game, we set the following four conditions: one person faced another person, one person faced a three-person group, a three-person group faced an individual, and a three-person group faced another three-person group. Previous studies have revealed that greed is activated when participants belong to a group, while fear is activated when participants interact with a group, and further, that attacking behaviors in the preemptive strike game are driven by fear. These observations led to a hypothesis that high attack rates would be realized when participants interact with a group, regardless of whether the participants make decisions as individuals or a group. The results of our experiment, however, rejected this hypothesis. Among the four conditions, the attack rate was highest when a three-person group faced an individual. As possible reasons for our observation, we discuss the potential threat stemming from the imbalance in the effectiveness of attack between individuals and groups, and the (incorrect) belief by groups that single individuals would be more likely to attack out of fear.

To ensure sustainability, overcoming intergenerational conflict is vital, and social systems supporting decision-making that takes into account the benefits to future generations is thus critically important. One promising approach in such social systems is introducing “imaginary future generations” who act as representatives for the benefits of future generation in actual, present-day decision-making situations. In this study, we explore the effects and implications of participants’ experiences as representatives of imaginary future generation. We conducted a citizens’ participatory debate on creating a vision and appropriate policies associated with public facilities and housing in a town in Japan, and examined how the thinking patterns and decisions of the participants shifted as a result of debating from the perspectives of both current and imaginary future generations. Based on analyses of a questionnaire and the keywords in answers to a worksheet provided to the participants, we demonstrate that through their experiences as representatives of imaginary future generations, a clear shift in perspective occurred, with increases in self-reflective viewpoint. We also found that the shared viewpoints of the current and future generations existed within the individuals. These findings hint at how we can develop institutions and social systems that facilitate sustainable decision-making.

Referendum, Turnout threshold, Participation quorum, Strategic abstention, Game theory,

Does voting solve the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? Do voting rules matter when trying to induce people to collectively select a sustainable alternative that leaves more resources for future generations? To answer these questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment using an intergenerational sustainability dilemma game in which players are asked to choose between two alternatives. Choosing the alternative that maximizes the players’ immediate benefit decreases the resources left for subsequent generations. The choice is made by the votes cast within small groups representing successive generations. We compare three voting rules: ordinary voting, whereby each person in the group has one vote; proxy voting, whereby some but not all of the players are given an extra vote to cast on behalf of subsequent generations; and two-ballot voting, whereby all players are given an extra vote. We observe that both proxy voting and two-ballot voting increase the frequency at which the sustainable alternative is selected; however, the frequency of such a choice remains low. This suggests that voting individually is a relatively ineffective way to elicit sustainable choices from successive generations even if the rules of voting are modified.