Does Good Economics Make for Good Politics? Evidence from Indian States

Vaishnav, Milan; Swanson, Reedy

doi:10.1080/14736489.2015.1066218

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…There is also increasing evidence of performance-based—or economic—voting in India (Verma 2012; Gupta and Panagariya 2014; Vaishnav and Swanson 2015). Cole, Healy, and Werker et al (2012) show that voters are less likely to punish the ruling coalition for weather emergencies when the government responds effectively to them .…”

Section: Ethnic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case

Auerbach¹,

Bussell²,

Chauchard³

et al. 2021

Perspect. polit.

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In the study of electoral politics and political behavior in the developing world, India is often considered to be an exemplar of the centrality of contingency in distributive politics, the role of ethnicity in shaping political behavior, and the organizational weakness of political parties. Whereas these axioms have some empirical basis, the massive changes in political practices, the vast variation in political patterns, and the burgeoning literature on subnational dynamics in India mean that such generalizations are not tenable. In this article, we consider research on India that compels us to rethink the contention that India neatly fits the prevailing wisdom in the comparative politics literature. Our objective is to elucidate how the many nuanced insights about Indian politics can improve our understanding of electoral behavior both across and within other countries, allowing us to question core assumptions in theories of comparative politics.

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Section: Ethnic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case

Auerbach¹,

Bussell²,

Chauchard³

et al. 2021

Perspect. polit.

Self Cite

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show abstract

“…The existing literature on globalization tends to argue that voters in more open economies are less likely to reward or punish the government for their own economic performance than those in more closed economies (Duch and Stevenson, 2010; Fernández-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007). In India’s case, however, the economy remains relatively closed even after nearly three decades of liberalization, and domestic economic outcomes still play a pivotal role in determining the incumbent’s electoral performance (Gupta and Panagariya, 2014; Vaishnav and Swanson, 2015). Because liberalization following 1991 is widely credited with enabling the very high economic growth rates that India has experienced since (Mukherji, 2010), it is often suggested that voters in India became increasingly aware of the government’s ability to stimulate the economy and thus increasingly likely to hold the government responsible for economic performance.…”

Section: The Effects Of Growth On Vote Volatilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The impact of changing economic circumstances on electoral outcomes has been widely studied but primarily within developed economies and primarily with respect to whether the incumbent party or party coalition loses the upcoming election or a portion of its vote share (Brender and Drazen, 2008; Gupta and Panagariya, 2014; Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Uppal, 2009). While the majority of studies find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that economic conditions matter (for India, see Khemani, 2004), there are a sufficient number of ambiguous findings to suggest that winning versus losing and/or the size of the change in an incumbent’s vote share may be too narrow a measure to capture the full impact of economic conditions on election outcomes (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Bengtsson, 2004; Evans and Anderson, 2006; Ravishankar, 2009; Vaishnav and Swanson, 2015; Verma, 2012). Moreover, economic conditions can generate more effects on voting behavior and electoral stability than just those experienced by the incumbent party.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic performance and electoral volatility: Testing the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states, 1957–2013

Dash

Ferris

2020

Party Politics

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The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more sensitive to growth rates. Examination of the periodicity of income growth’s impact finds that growth in the final year of governance has a stronger effect on volatility than does the average growth rate arising over the incumbent’s tenure. We confirm for Indian states that vote volatility responds more to negative changes than positive changes in the growth rate and, by decomposing volatility and find, contrary to most studies, that growth rates affect internal vote shifting more than between exiting parties and newcomers. The responsiveness of volatility to economic and political characteristics of the state reinforces the hypothesis that theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding electoral volatility and may provide a more insightful way of approaching the political business cycle.

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“…Political variables are drawn from Vaishnav and Swanson (2015). The BJP alliance is a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 when the incumbent government is headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and 0 otherwise.…”

Section: Appendix a Data Appendix Table A1 Gender Budgeting States Vs...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Authors' estimates based on data from CEIC India Premium Database,Mundle et al (2016),Vaishnav and Swanson (2015), and Ministry ofWomen and Child Development (2015). Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Gender Budgeting in Indian States on Gender Inequality and Fiscal Spending

Stotsky

Zaman²

2016

IMF Working Papers

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This study investigates the effect of gender budgeting in India on gender inequality and fiscal spending. Gender budgeting is an approach to budgeting in which governments use fiscal policies and administration to address gender inequality and women's advancement. There is little quantitative study of its impact. Indian states offer a relatively unique framework for assessing the effect of gender budgeting. States with gender budgeting efforts have made more progress on gender equality in primary school enrollment than those without, though economic growth appears insufficient to generate equality on its own. The implications of gender budgeting for fiscal spending were more ambiguous.

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Does Good Economics Make for Good Politics? Evidence from Indian States

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case

Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case

Economic performance and electoral volatility: Testing the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states, 1957–2013

The Influence of Gender Budgeting in Indian States on Gender Inequality and Fiscal Spending

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