Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case

Abstract

In the study of electoral politics and political behavior in the developing world, India is often considered to be an exemplar of the centrality of contingency in distributive politics, the role of ethnicity in shaping political behavior, and the organizational weakness of political parties. Whereas these axioms have some empirical basis, the massive changes in political practices, the vast variation in political patterns, and the burgeoning literature on subnational dynamics in India mean that such generalizations are not tenable. In this article, we consider research on India that compels us to rethink the contention that India neatly fits the prevailing wisdom in the comparative politics literature. Our objective is to elucidate how the many nuanced insights about Indian politics can improve our understanding of electoral behavior both across and within other countries, allowing us to question core assumptions in theories of comparative politics.

Political Parties and Violence in Karachi, Pakistan

“…In weakly institutionalized democracies, where political parties are often a conglomeration of local notables and elites, party organizational structures are usually underdeveloped (Chhibber et al, 2014; Erdmann, 2007). However, as Auerbach et al (2022) nicely encapsulate in their study of Indian political parties, “there is more than one way for parties to be ‘strong’” (256–257). The authors differentiate between parties which are weak “as organizations,” such that they lack physical infrastructure and clearly demarcated and consistently enforced allocation of power, but which may nonetheless be strong “as networks” (Auerbach et al, 2022, p. 258).…”

Who Moved my Welfare Scheme? Federalism and the Politics of Credit Attribution in Rural India

“…Elected public officials also actively provide services to their constituents through non-partisan ‘constituency service’ (Bussell, 2019). It is increasingly believed that any form of quid-pro-quo linkages for welfare delivery, as emphasized in the literature on ‘clientelism’ (Casas, 2020; Chandra, 2004; Hicken, 2011), may be difficult to sustain for political parties or leaders (Auerbach et al, 2021). In the absence of direct linkage with votes, it is puzzling to see political parties investing significant political capital in enacting welfare schemes and facilitating the delivery of benefits.…”

Social Brokerage: Accountability and the Social Life of Information

“…2 The comparative politics literature on intermediaries, in turn, is focused almost exclusively on political brokers embedded in electoral networks (Stokes et al, 2013; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007), and so has relatively little to say about the role of brokers in social accountability. Recent literature on political intermediaries moves beyond the narrow conception of a “party broker” tied to single partisan machine (Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015), and relaxes the notion of a strict quid pro quo while also extending beyond elections (Auerbach et al, 2021; Nichter, 2018). The intermediation in these studies, however, is still firmly “political” in the classic sense that brokers serve as “gatekeepers” between citizen-voters and politician-agents (“acting as go-betweens between the flow of goods and services and the flow of support and votes,” Auyero, 2000, p. 67).…”