Does Four-dimensionalism explain coincidence?

Moyer, Mark

doi:10.1080/00048400802421707

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…That is why Thomasson characterizes four-dimensionalism as a "crazy metaphysics" 16 Given the different sortalish properties between two constitutionally related objects and the application of the Leibniz's Law, according to which necessarily, for every x and every y, x and y are identical only if every property of x is also a property of y (and vice versa), viz., □∀x∀y[x=y→∀F(Fx↔Fy)], David and the Clay that constitutes it are two spatially coinciding objects. 17 For a critical view about four-dimensionalist solutions to the problem of material coincidence, see Moyer (2009) and McGrath (2007). (2007, p. 78) in which just by having on our hands an ordinary material object, many objects (temporal parts) are constantly coming into existence ex nihilo at different times.…”

Section: Criticisms Of Four-dimensionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism

Erices¹

2022

Tópicos (México)

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Is it possible for two material objects to share the very same boundary? Material collocation is a metaphysical thesis that allows for two qualitatively distinct objects to share the same boundary of a matter-filled region of space and, therefore, to be made of the same stuff despite them differing in some metaphysical respects (e.g., temporal or modal properties). This article addresses the metaphysical implications of material collocation on a boundary account and how things persist across time. It discusses endurantism and perdurantism in terms of boundaries: while the former postulates physical objects as entities having boundaries along the three spatial dimensions, the latter postulates them as entities having boundaries along four dimensions, considering time as an extra dimension. Finally, the article raises two criticisms against perdurantism: one related to Heller’s commitment to boundary essentialism of four-dimensional objects, and the other to the resemblance argument between spatial and temporal boundaries.vamente diferentes comparten el mismo límite de una región espacial material y, por lo tanto, se componen de la misma materia a pesar de que difieren en algunos aspectos metafísicos (e.g., propiedades temporales y/o modales). Este artículo aborda las implicaciones metafísicas de la colocación en relación con una tesis sobre límites y persistencia temporal. Se plantea una discusión sobre endurantismo y perdurantismo: mientras el primero entiende los objetos físicos como entidades con límites en las tres dimensiones espaciales, el último los entiende como entidades que poseen límites en cuatro dimensiones, considerando el tiempo como una más. Finalmente, el artículo sostiene dos críticas al perdurantismo y sus compromisos con los límites: una relacionada con consecuencias esencialistas, la otra con una analogía problemática entre límites espaciales y límites temporales.

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Section: Criticisms Of Four-dimensionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism

Erices¹

2022

Tópicos (México)

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“…These include puzzles of grounding, 61 in which we worry about what could ground two coinciding objects having different modal properties at 58 See Gilmore (2007). 59 For discussion of this argument, see Eddon (2010b), Gilmore (2007), andMoyer (2009). 60 See Lewis (1986) and Sider (2001).…”

Section: The Nature Of Actual Processionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is because (or so the thought goes) existence is not vague. It cannot be vague whether or not y exists, 62 See, for instance, Moyer (2009) for discussion of these issues. 63 See Effingham and Robson (2007) and Daniels (2013Daniels ( , 2014Daniels ( (a), 2014.…”

Section: The Nature Of Actual Processionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Persistence

Miller

2022

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Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.

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“…Their principle 1.12 essentially says: for any x and y, if everything disjoint from the one is disjoint from the other, then x = y. (1940, p. 49) 7 Defenders say that, unlike a person trying to walk through a wall, the coincidence in question would be unproblematic since the objects would share the same parts (Wiggins 1968, Moyer 2009. The point seems to be that the composite objects don't themselves have mass, but must 'borrow' mass from its parts.…”

Section: Proper Parthood and Materials Constitutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-concrete parts of material objects

Longenecker

2017

Synthese

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This article offers a novel solution to the problem of material constitution: by including non-concrete objects among the parts of material objects, we can avoid having a statue and its constituent piece of clay composed of all the same proper parts. Non-concrete objects-objects that aren't concrete, but possibly are-have been used (by Bernard Linsky, Ed Zalta and Timothy Williamson) in defense of the claim that everything necessarily exists. But the account offered shows that non-concreta are independently useful in other domains as well. The resulting view falls under a 'non-material partist' class of views that includes, in particular, Laurie Paul's and Kathrin Koslicki's constitution views; ones where material objects have properties or structures as parts respectively. The article gives reasons for preferring the nonconcretist solution over these other non-material partist views and defends it against objections.

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Does Four-dimensionalism explain coincidence?

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism

Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism

Persistence

Non-concrete parts of material objects

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