Non-concrete parts of material objects

Abstract

This article offers a novel solution to the problem of material constitution: by including non-concrete objects among the parts of material objects, we can avoid having a statue and its constituent piece of clay composed of all the same proper parts. Non-concrete objects-objects that aren't concrete, but possibly are-have been used (by Bernard Linsky, Ed Zalta and Timothy Williamson) in defense of the claim that everything necessarily exists. But the account offered shows that non-concreta are independently useful in other domains as well. The resulting view falls under a 'non-material partist' class of views that includes, in particular, Laurie Paul's and Kathrin Koslicki's constitution views; ones where material objects have properties or structures as parts respectively. The article gives reasons for preferring the nonconcretist solution over these other non-material partist views and defends it against objections.

Is the abstract vs concrete distinction exhaustive & exclusive? Four reasons to be suspicious

“…The preceding four arguments are certainly not the only available paths towards suspicion of E&E. While not many in the recent literature commit to its outright rejection, as noted earlier some do (examples would include Dumsday (2021), Linsky and Zalta (1996), Longenecker (2018), andWilliamson (2002)), and I have not considered their arguments here. Taking them all together might strengthen a larger cumulative case for having rational doubts about E&E.…”

On the Possibility of Presentism with Occurrents

“…In a certain sense, we could say that this view has pedigree. Indeed, the theory could fit in a class of theories that we might call non-material partism, following Longenecker (2018). Three examples of non-material partism are Laurie Paul's theory of logical parts, Kathrin Koslicki's neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism and, more recently, Michael Longenecker's non-concrete partism.…”

“…Structure, that plays the role of form in her theory, is just a part of an object together with its matter. Finally, Longenecker (2018) argues that his non-concrete partism allows to solve the problem of material constitution in a novel way. This latter view in particular makes use of ex-concrete or contingently non-concrete objects as EXPO does.…”

“…All these views, including the theory I proposed, are united by the same two problems, problems that are only apparent though. These problems go under the names of spatialism and categorialism (Longenecker 2018).…”

“…Additionally, it seems that all the proponents of theories similar to EXPO, e.g. Paul (2002), Koslicki (2008), Longenecker (2018), must deny the principle of concreteness. Thus, EXPO in this respect, is not different from all those theories.…”