Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?

Montero, Barbara Gail

doi:10.1080/00201741003612138

Cited by 88 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Of course, it is likely that with practice the musician will pay less and less attention to the instrument while playing. We do not think it is appropriate to say, however, that the musician at some point comes to play unconsciously, as if she were on automatic pilot (see also Montero, 2010). Certainly she acquires many sensorimotor automatisms.…”

Section: Individualization and Entrenchmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

196

179

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In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the "extended-mind" view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Sterelny's Scaffolded MindSterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This term refers to the idea that the mind is "environmentally supported," more specifically that 2 cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the organism's chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn affects the beaver's behavior and that of its progeny.Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what Sterenly calls "intergenerational social learning"; see also Sterelny, 2012).Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, b...

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Section: Individualization and Entrenchmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

196

179

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…25 We are also unsure how to settle disagreements about the relevant phenomenology. Montero (2010), for example, describes the phenomenology of expert athletics in terms starkly different than does Dreyfus. Finally, while we accept that phenomenology plays an 24 Steve Blass was a tremendously successful pitcher in Major League Baseball who suddenly and inexplicitly lost his ability to pitch.…”

Section: New No-belief Casesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…While some research appears to support the idea that overthinking is the problem in cases like these (e.g., Flegal and Anderson 2008;Beilock and Gray 2012), the issue remains unsettled. For critical discussion, see Montero (2010) and Brownstein (2014). 25 Note that Stanley (2011a, b) discusses some related arguments due to Kelly (2000Kelly ( , 2002 and Toribio (2008).…”

Section: New No-belief Casesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

Brownstein

Michaelson

2015

Synthese

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We consider a range of cases-both hypothetical and actual-in which agents apparently know how to ϕ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact ϕ is a way for them to ϕ . These "no-belief" cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to ϕ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to ϕ , then an agent cannot both know how to ϕ and fail to believe that w, the way that she ϕ s, is a way for her to ϕ . We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent's avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like "implicit beliefs"-which conflict with an agent's avowed beliefs-in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.

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“…Our expectation is that numerous specific differences will be apparent, but the core structure of high-order control will, nevertheless, be present in most skills. Montero (2010) argues that in elite skills individuals typically strive for continual improvement, and they may need to innovate to succeed in high stakes performances. Conversely, she suggests that in the case of artistic skills, rote performances are dull and tend toward stereotypes.…”

Section: The Relation Between Skill and The Sense Of Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Montero, 2010). See McIlwain and Sutton (2015) for a methodological discussion of the value and challenges of research in which the researcher is a practitioner.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The sense of agency and its role in strategic control for expert mountain bikers.

Christensen¹,

Bicknell²,

McIlwain³

et al. 2015

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

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Much work on the sense of agency has focused either on abnormal cases, such as delusions of control, or on simple action tasks in the laboratory. Few studies address the nature of the sense of agency in complex natural settings, or the effect of skill on the sense of agency. Working from 2 case studies of mountain bike riding, we argue that the sense of agency in high-skill individuals incorporates awareness of multiple causal influences on action outcomes. This allows fine-grained differentiation of the contributions of self and external factors to action outcomes. We further argue that the sense of agency incorporates prospective awareness of actions that are possible in a situation and awareness of the limits of control. These forms of sense of agency enable highly flexible, context-sensitive strategic control, and are likely to contribute to high interindividual variability in responses to complex tasks.

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Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?

Cited by 88 publications

References 33 publications

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution

The sense of agency and its role in strategic control for expert mountain bikers.

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