Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Abstract

In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the "extended-mind" view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Sterelny's Scaffolded MindSterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This term refers to the idea that the mind is "environmentally supported," more specifically that 2 cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the organism's chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn affects the beaver's behavior and that of its progeny.Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what Sterenly calls "intergenerational social learning"; see also Sterelny, 2012).Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, b...

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