Do Term Limits “Limit” the Speaker? Examining the Effects of Legislative Term Limits on State Speaker Power

Abstract

What is the role of legislative term limits in the structure of legislative institutions? Using Mooney’s collective action problem theoretical framework on legislative leadership power, I claim that legislative term limits should be a key determinant in a state Speaker’s power via the delegation of institutional tools that control the lawmaking process. Speakers can use these tools to influence policy outcomes and their colleagues. I test this expectation in an analysis of lower chamber rules in nearly all states between 1981 and 2015. The results indicate that states with implemented term limits are associated with a more powerful Speaker. These findings suggest that a more nuanced relationship between legislative term limits and leadership power exist than previously thought.

The Consequences of Legislative Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures: A Review

“…Some scholars find that professionalism strengthens leaders’ powers (e.g., Clucas 2007) while others find the opposite (Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz 1996; Richman 2010). Furthermore, in the research’s most recent contribution, Shay (2021) finds no relationship between the two. Perhaps Richman’s (2010) study provides a framework for future clarification.…”

“… 10. Created by Clucas (2001) and later updated by Mooney (2013), the index of Speaker power is the foundation of many studies on leadership in state legislatures (e.g., Miller, Nicholson-Crotty, and Nicholson-Crotty 2011; Mooney 2013; Richman 2010; Shay 2021). …”

Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: a critical review and way forward

“…Another important institutional consideration is the formal powers afforded to majority party leaders and committee chairs in legislative bodies (e.g., Anzia and Jackman 2013;Anderson et al 2016). Formal powers are in part a product of other institutional arrangements, such as the presence or absence of term limits (Carey et al 2006;Mooney 2012;Shay 2020). Basseches (2019) shows that the concentration of institutional power in the hands of majority party leadership, even when the majority party is Democratic, facilitates access and influence for business actors while limiting it for environmental groups.…”

Be Careful what You Count: Updating Legislative Turnover in the 50 States

“…Turnover is associated with legislative careerism (Habel, 2008; Moncrief et al, 2004), legislative behavior (Kerby & Blidook, 2011; Kirkland, 2014; Uppal & Glazer, 2015), and even has ties to democratic legitimacy (François & Grossman, 2015). Measures of turnover are also routinely used as a control in studies of the state legislature where turnover is not the primary interest (Maestas, 2000; Makse, 2019; Melusky, 2018; Stonecash, 1999; Shay, 2020).…”